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use#LAATHE EFFECT OF FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT ON
CONVERGENCE: THEORY AND EVIDENCE*
PHILIPPE AGHION
PETER HOWITT
DAVID MAYER-FOULKES
We introduce imperfect creditor protection in a multicountry Schumpeterian
growth model. The theory predicts that any country with more than some critical
level of ﬁnancial development will converge to the growth rate of the world
technology frontier, and that all other countries will have a strictly lower long-run
growth rate. We present evidence supporting these and other implications, in the
form of a cross-country growth regression with a signiﬁcant and sizable negative
coefﬁcient on initial per-capita GDP (relative to the United States) interacted with
ﬁnancial intermediation. In addition, we ﬁnd that other variables representing
schooling, geography, health, policy, politics, and institutions do not affect the
signiﬁcance of the interaction between ﬁnancial intermediation and initial per
capita GDP, and do not show any independent effect on convergence in the
regressions. Our ﬁndings are robust to removal of outliers and to alternative
conditioning sets, estimation procedures, and measures of ﬁnancial development.
I. INTRODUCTION
Most current theories of the cross-country distribution of
per-capita income imply that all countries share the same long-
run growth rate (of TFP or per-capita GDP). Yet the historical
record shows that growth rates can differ substantially across
countries for long periods of time. For example, Pritchett [1997]
estimates that the proportional gap in per-capita GDP between
the richest and poorest countries grew more than ﬁvefold from
1870 to 1990, and according to the tables in Maddison [2001] the
proportional gap between the richest group of countries and the
poorest
1 grew from 3 in 1820 to 19 in 1998.
The “great divergence” between rich and poor countries con-
tinued through the end of the twentieth century. Although many
* With the usual caveat we thank Daron Acemoglu, Alberto Alesina, Jess
Benhabib, Sean Campbell, Sebnem Kalemli-Ozcan, Ross Levine, Andrei Shleifer,
David Weil, three anonymous referees, and participants at the 2003 NBER Sum-
mer Institute, McMaster University, the 2003 Canadian Macroeconomics Study
Group, the Federal Reserve Board, Brigham Young University, New York Uni-
versity, and Harvard University for helpful comments. Cristina Santos and
Stylianos Michalopoulos provided excellent research assistance.
1. The richest group was Western Europe in 1820 and the “European Off-
shoots” (Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United States) in 1998. The
poorest group was Africa in both years.
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173studies
2 show that a large group of rich and middle-income coun-
tries have been converging to parallel growth paths over the past
50 years or so, the gap between these countries as a whole and the
very poorest countries as a whole has continued to widen. For
example, the proportional gap in per-capita GDP between Mayer-
Foulkes’s [2002] richest and poorest convergence groups grew by
a factor of 2.6 between 1960 and 1995, and the proportional gap
between Maddison’s richest and poorest groups grew by a factor
of 1.75 between 1950 and 1998.
Technology appears to be the central factor underlying diver-
gence. Easterly and Levine [2001] estimate that about 60 percent
of the cross-country variation in growth rates of per-capita GDP
is attributable to differences in productivity growth, while Kle-
now and Rodrı ´guez-Clare [1997] estimate that in their sample
about 90 percent of the variation is attributable to differences in
productivity growth. Although the level of productivity can be
affected by many factors other than technology, such as geogra-
phy and institutions that affect the efﬁciency of resource alloca-
tion, it is hard to see how substantial differences in the growth
rate of productivity persisting for such long periods of time can be
accounted for by these nontechnological factors, which are them-
selves highly persistent over time. Instead, it seems more likely
that divergence reﬂects long-lasting cross-country differences in
rates of technological progress.
These facts are especially puzzling when one takes into
account the possibility of international technology transfer and
the “advantage of backwardness” [Gerschenkron 1952] that it
confers on technological laggards. That is, the further a coun-
try falls behind the world’s technology leaders, the easier it is
for that country to progress technologically simply by imple-
menting new technologies that have been discovered else-
where. Eventually this advantage should be enough to stabilize
the proportional gap that separates it from the leaders. This is
what happens in neoclassical models where technology trans-
fer is instantaneous [Mankiw, Romer, and Weil 1992], where
technologies developed on the frontier are not “appropriate” for
poorer countries [Basu and Weil 1998; Acemoglu and Zilibotti
2001], where technology transfer can be blocked by special
2. For example, Barro and Sala-i-Martin [1992], Mankiw, Romer, and Weil
[1992], and Evans [1996].
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try adopts institutions that impede technology transfer [Ace-
moglu, Aghion, and Zilibotti 2002].
This paper explores the hypothesis that ﬁnancial constraints
prevent poor countries from taking full advantage of technology
transfer and that this is what causes some of them to diverge
from the growth rate of the world frontier. It introduces credit
constraints into a multicountry version of Schumpeterian growth
theory with technology transfer,
3 and shows that the model im-
plies a form of club convergence consistent with the broad facts
outlined above. In the theory, countries above some threshold
level of ﬁnancial development will all converge to the same long-
run growth rate, and all other countries will have strictly lower
long-run growth rates.
There are three key components to the theory. The ﬁrst is
that because technological knowledge is often tacit and circum-
stantially speciﬁc,
4 technology transfer requires the receiving
country to invest resources in order to master foreign technol-
ogies and adapt them to the local environment. Although these
investments may not ﬁt the conventional deﬁnition of R&D,
they play the same role as R&D in an innovation-based growth
model; that is, they generate new technological possibilities
where they are conducted, building on previous knowledge.
5
Accordingly, our theory assigns to R&D the role that Nelson
and Phelps [1966] assumed was played by human capital,
namely that of determining a country’s “absorptive capacity.”
6
The second key component is the assumption that as the
global technology frontier advances, the size of investment
required in order to keep innovating at the same pace as before
3. See Aghion and Howitt [1998], Howitt [2000], Acemoglu, Aghion, and
Zilibotti [2002], and Howitt and Mayer-Foulkes [2002]. The last of these papers
implies three convergence groups, analogous to the three groups of the present
paper, but the disadvantage of backwardness that prevents some countries from
converging in that paper arises from low levels of human capital rather than from
credit-market imperfections.
4. See Arrow [1969] and Evenson and Westphal [1995].
5. Cohen and Levinthal [1989] and Grifﬁth, Redding, and Van Reenen [2001]
have also argued that R&D by the receiving country is a necessary input to
technology transfer.
6. Grossman and Helpman [1991] and Barro and Sala-i-Martin [1997] also
model technology transfer as taking place through a costly investment process,
which they portray as imitation; but in these models technology transfer always
leads to convergence in growth rates except in special cases studied by Grossman
and Helpman where technology transfer is inactive in the long run.
175 FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND CONVERGENCErises in proportion. This assumption recognizes the force of
increasing complexity, which makes technologies increasingly
difﬁcult to master and to adapt to local circumstances.
7
The third key component is an agency problem that limits an
innovator’s access to external ﬁnance. Speciﬁcally, we assume
that an innovator can defraud her creditors by hiding the results
of a successful innovation, at a cost that depends positively on the
level of ﬁnancial development. Because of this, in equilibrium the
innovator’s access to external ﬁnance will be limited to some
multiple of her own wage income. Since wages are limited by
domestic productivity, therefore a technological laggard can face
a disadvantage of backwardness that counteracts Gerschenkron’s
advantage; that is, the further behind the frontier it falls the less
its innovators will be able to invest relative to what is required in
order to keep innovating at a given rate. The lower the level of
ﬁnancial development in the country the greater will be this
disadvantage.
Our paper relates to several important strands of theory
relating growth, convergence, and ﬁnancial-market development.
There is ﬁrst the literature on poverty traps and interpersonal
convergence or divergence in economies with credit market im-
perfections, in particular Banerjee and Newman [1993], Galor
and Zeira [1993], Aghion and Bolton [1997], and Piketty [1997].
In these models,
8 all agents face the same production technology
and, unlike in our model, the same (productivity-adjusted) invest-
ment costs,
9 and what generates poverty traps are either noncon-
vexities in production or monitoring, or pecuniary externalities
working through factor prices. However, there is no technical
progress and therefore no positive long-run growth in these mod-
els, which therefore cannot analyze the issue of long-term con-
vergence in growth rates.
Another literature analyzes the effects of ﬁnancial con-
straints or ﬁnancial intermediation on long-term growth. Thus,
7. A similar assumption has been shown elsewhere to be helpful in account-
ing for the fact that productivity growth rates have remained stable in OECD
countries over the second half of the twentieth century despite a steady increase
in R&D expenditures. See Jones [1995] and Howitt [1999].
8. See Banerjee [2003] for a comprehensive survey of this literature.
9. In contrast, in our model countries face a productivity-adjusted cost of
innovation which increases with its distance to the technological frontier. It is the
interplay between credit constraints and this technological heterogeneity which
generates the possibility of long-term divergence.
176 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICSGreenwood and Jovanovic [1990], Levine [1991], Bencivenga and
Smith [1991, 1993], Saint-Paul [1992], Sussman [1993], Harri-
son, Sussman, and Zeira [1999], and Kahn [2001] analyze the
effects of ﬁnancial intermediation on growth in an AK-style model
with no distinction being made between investing in technology
and investing in physical or human capital. King and Levine
[1993b], de la Fuente and Marin [1996], Galetovic [1996], Black-
burn and Hung [1998], and Morales [2003] consider the relation-
ship between ﬁnance and growth in the context of innovation-
based growth models. De Gregorio [1996] studies the effects on
growth of ﬁnancial constraints that inhibit human capital accu-
mulation. Krebs [2003] shows how imperfect sharing of individ-
ual human-capital risk can depress long-run growth. However,
none of these models analyzes the process of technology transfer
that we are focusing on, and therefore none of them is capable of
addressing the question of why technology transfer is not sufﬁ-
cient to put all countries on parallel long-run growth paths.
The paper also produces evidence to support its main impli-
cations. There is already a substantial body of evidence
10 to the
effect that ﬁnancial development is an important determinant of
a country’s short-run growth rate, almost all of which is predi-
cated on the assumption of long-run convergence in growth rates.
We extend this analysis to allow for the possibility of different
long-run growth rates, using a cross section of 71 countries over
the period 1960–1995. Speciﬁcally, we use the same data, condi-
tioning sets, instruments, and robustness checks as Levine,
Loayza, and Beck [2000], who found a strong and robust effect of
the level of ﬁnancial development in a standard cross-country
growth regression. We add to their regression an interaction term
between the log of initial per-capita GDP (relative to the United
States) and ﬁnancial development, and interpret a negative coef-
ﬁcient as evidence that low ﬁnancial development makes conver-
gence less likely. We ﬁnd that the coefﬁcient is indeed negative,
and is large both statistically and economically.
Our empirical methodology is similar to that of Benhabib and
Spiegel [2005], who found a negative interaction term between ini-
tial TFP and schooling and concluded that schooling was a key
determinant of whether or not a country will converge to the frontier
10. See the surveys by Levine [1997, 2005] and the book by Demirgu ¨c ¸-Kunt
and Levine [2001].
177 FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND CONVERGENCEgrowth rate. We test the robustness of our results by including both
schooling and an interaction term between the initial GDP gap and
schooling as additional regressors in our equation. In addition, we
repeat this robustness test using instead of schooling a large number
of different variables suggested by other growth theories. In all cases
the main implications of our theory pass the test. We also present
evidence to the effect that the main channel through which ﬁnancial
development affects convergence is productivity growth, as implied
by the theory, rather than capital accumulation, and show that our
results are robust to elimination of outliers, to alternative condition-
ing sets, to alternative estimation procedures and to alternative
measures of ﬁnancial development.
II. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
We follow Acemoglu, Aghion, and Zilibotti [2002] in casting
Schumpeterian growth theory in a simple discrete-time frame-
work. There are m countries, who do not exchange goods or
factors, but do make use of each others’ technological ideas. There
is a continuum of individuals in each country. Each country has
a ﬁxed population P, which for notational convenience we nor-
malize to unity. Thus, aggregate and per-capita quantities are
identical. Everyone lives for two periods, being endowed with two
units of labor services in the ﬁrst period and none in the second,
with a utility function linear
11 in consumption: U  c1  c2,
where 0 1. Within each country the growth path is deter-
mined as follows.
II.A. The General Sector
There is one multipurpose “general” good, produced by labor
and a continuum of specialized intermediate goods according to
the production function,
11. Linear utility implies that people are indifferent between investing in any
country, whether technologically or ﬁnancially developed or not. We assume that
all investment is locally ﬁnanced, but if  were the same across all countries, we
could allow perfect capital mobility with no change in the analysis. Extending our
analysis to the case of strictly concave utility would allow us to analyze the
possibility and implications of capital ﬂowing from less to more ﬁnancially devel-
oped economies in accordance with Lucas’ [1990] oft-cited observation that capital
ﬂows from poor to rich countries rather than the reverse.
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1
0
1
Ati
1xti
 di,0    1,
where xt(i) is the input of the latest version of intermediate good
i and At(i) is the productivity parameter associated with it. The
general good is used for consumption, as an input to R&D and
also as an input to the production of intermediate goods.
The general good is produced under perfect competition, so
the price of each intermediate good equals its marginal
product:
(2) pti  
xti
Ati
1
.
(We use the general good as nume ´raire, and P  1.)
II.B. Intermediate Sectors
For each intermediate good i there is one person born each
period t  1 who is capable of producing an innovation for the
next period. This person is called the ith innovator in t  1, and
if she succeeds (innovates), then she will be the ith incumbent in
t. Let 	t(i) be the probability that she succeeds. Then
Ati 
A 
t with probability 	ti
At1i with probability 1  	ti ,
where A 
t is the world technology frontier, which grows at the
constant rate g 
 0, taken as given for now. The fact that a
successful innovator gets to implement A 
t is a manifestation of
technology transfer, of the kind that Keller [2002] calls “active”;
that is, domestic R&D makes use of ideas developed elsewhere in
the world.
12
12. In Aghion, Howitt, and Mayer-Foulkes [2004] we extend our analysis and
results to the more general case in which innovations do not result in an imme-
diate jump to the frontier, so that
Ati 
bA 
t  1  bAt1 with probability 	ti
At1i with probability 1  	ti ,
where
At 
0
1
Ati di
is the average domestic productivity at date t and b is a real number between
0 and 1.
179 FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND CONVERGENCEIn each intermediate sector where an innovation has just
occurred, the incumbent is able to produce any amount of the
intermediate good using as the sole input one unit of the general
good per unit of intermediate good. In addition, in every interme-
diate sector there are an unlimited number of people capable of
producing copies of the latest generation of that intermediate
good at a unit cost of 
1.
13
So in sectors where an innovation has just occurred, the
incumbent will be the sole producer, at a price equal to the unit
cost of the competitive fringe,
14 whereas in noninnovating sectors
where the most recent incumbent is dead, production will take
place under perfect competition with a price equal to the unit cost
of each producer. In either event the price will be , and according
to the demand function (2) the quantity demanded will be
(3) xti 


1/1
Ati.
It follows that an unsuccessful innovator will earn zero prof-
its next period, whereas the proﬁt of an incumbent will be t(i) 
A 
t, where (1)(/)
1/(1).
II.C. Aggregate Behavior
Deﬁne the country’s “average productivity” At as
At 
0
1
Ati di.
Substituting (3) into (1), we see that gross output of the general
good will be
Zt  At,
where (/)
/(1).
In equilibrium the probability of innovation will be the same
in each sector: 	t(i) 	 t for all i; therefore, average productivity
evolves according to
13. Thus, imitation of a successful innovation is costless within a country,
whereas we shall assume below that, because of the well-documented fact that
technologies work differently in different countries, moving a domestic sector up
to the world technology frontier is costly and requires a positive R&D investment.
14. This requires the further assumption that 
, which we now make.
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t  1  	tAt1.
That is, the productivity parameter will equal A 
t in the fraction
	t of sectors that innovated at t  1, but will remain equal to
At1(i) in the 1 	 t sectors that did not innovate at t  1, and
since innovations are distributed randomly across sectors the
average value of At1(i) among noninnovating sectors will equal
the economywide average At1.
Deﬁne the country’s normalized productivity as
at  At/A 
t.
Normalized productivity is an inverse measure of the country’s
distance to the technological frontier, or its “technology gap.” It
follows that the gap evolves according to
(4) at  	t 
1  	t
1  g at1.
Since the general sector is perfectly competitive, the wage
rate wt will be the marginal product of labor in producing the
general good:
wt  1  Zt  1  At.
The fact that wt is proportional to domestic productivity At plays
an important role in what follows. For as we shall see, it implies
that technology investment in a country that is credit-constrained
will be strictly proportional to At.
Value added in the general sector is wage income, whereas
value added in the intermediate sectors is proﬁt income. Per-
capita GDP is the sum of value added in all sectors:
Yt  wt  	tt  1  At  	tA 
t.
II.D. Innovations
In each sector the R&D investment needed to innovate at any
given rate 	t is governed by the cost function,
Nt1  n ˜	tA 
t  	t  	t
2/2A 
t ,   0,
where Nt1 is the quantity of general good that must be invested.
We multiply n ˜ by A 
t to recognize the “ﬁshing-out” effect; the
further ahead the frontier moves, the more difﬁcult it is to inno-
vate. This effect is crucial in what follows.
181 FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND CONVERGENCEIn our analysis below, we make extensive use of the inverse
of the R&D cost function n ˜. Namely, an intermediate producer
who invests the amount nA 
t in R&D will innovate next period
with probability
15
(5) 	 ˜ n  n ˜
1n  
2  2n  /.
Finally, we assume that
      .
This condition guarantees that the equilibrium probability 	t will
always lie strictly between 0 and 1.
In equilibrium 	t will be chosen so as to maximize the ex-
pected net payoff
(6) 	tA 
t  n ˜	tA 
t
in each sector, subject to credit constraints.
II.E. Equilibrium Innovation under Perfect Credit Markets
In this subsection we show that if innovators had unlimited
access to outside ﬁnance all economies would converge to the
same growth rate. The level of each country’s growth path might
be different because of country-speciﬁc differences in parameters
such as  and , but their long-run growth rates would all be the
same.
Suppose accordingly that each innovator can borrow (from
other young people) unlimited quantities at the going rate r 

1  1 subject to a binding commitment to repay if the project
succeeds. Then 	t will be chosen so as to maximize (6) with no
constraint. This implies that 	t 	 *, where
	*    /,
with corresponding equilibrium R&D expenditure
N* t1  n ˜	*A 
t  n*A 
t.
It follows from this and equation (4) that the country’s tech-
nology gap evolves according to
(7) at1  	* 
1  	*
1  g at  H1at,
15. Note that 	 ˜ (0)  0, 	 ˜ (n) 
 0 and 	 ˜ (n)  0.
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16
a* 
1  g	*
g  	*  0,1.
Per-capita GDP in the steady state is
(8) Y* t  1  a*  	*A 
t,
which grows at the same rate g as the technology frontier A 
t,a s
claimed.
II.F. Credit Constraints
Now suppose that credit markets are imperfect. Each entre-
preneur at the end of period t is a young person with access to the
wage income wt. Thus, to invest Nt in an R&D project, she must
borrow Nt  wt. Assume that if she pays a cost cNt she can
defraud her creditors by hiding the proceeds in the event that the
project is successful. This implies that in equilibrium the entre-
preneur cannot borrow more than a ﬁnite multiple of her accu-
mulated wealth
17 wt, as in Bernanke and Gertler [1989], and
therefore she cannot invest more than
wt
in innovation, where   [1, ) depends positively on the hiding
cost c.
This credit constraint will be binding if the unconstrained
optimal investment n*A 
t1 is strictly greater than the innova-
tor’s investment capacity wt, or equivalently, after dividing
through by A 
t1,i f
(9) n*  at,
where
 
1  
1  g .
16. The result that a* is strictly less than one reﬂects the fact that no
country, even the most technologically advanced in terms of its average produc-
tivity, will ever be the world leader in all intermediate sectors simultaneously,
because of the randomness of the innovation process. Thus, the model is consis-
tent with the evidence of Baily and Solow [2001] to the effect that different
countries are technology leaders in different industries.
17. See Appendix 1.
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equivalently by the credit multiplier  (or by ), on the grounds
that a highly developed ﬁnancial system protects creditors by
making it hard to defraud them.
We see from (9) that (i) for a given level of technological
development at of the country, domestic ﬁrms are more likely to
be credit-constrained if ﬁnancial development  is lower; (ii) for a
given level of ﬁnancial development  ﬁrms are more likely to be
credit-constrained the further the country is behind the techno-
logical frontier (i.e., the smaller is at). This is the “disadvantage
of backwardness” induced by the existence of credit constraints.
18
Thus, ﬁrms in more advanced countries with
at  n*/  a 
will invest the unconstrained amount n*A 
t1 in innovation and
therefore will innovate with probability 	*, whereas ﬁrms in less
advanced countries with
at  n*/  a 
cannot invest more than wt  atA 
t1 and therefore will inno-
vate with probability
	 ˜ at  	*,
where the innovation technology 	 ˜ is given by (5).
19
In that case at1 will be determined according to
(10) at1  	 ˜ at 
1  	 ˜ at
1  g at  H2at.
18. Our model implies that, holding the credit multiplier  (or ) constant,
among those countries that are ﬁnancially constrained external ﬁnancing (equal
to (1)wt) is bigger in those that are closer to the technological frontier.
However, the opposite is true among those countries that are not constrained, as
the amount of external ﬁnancing is then entirely determined by the gap between
the R&D cost n*A 
t, which is proportional to the frontier productivity A 
t, and the
amount of internal ﬁnance which is proportional to current domestic productivity.
19. This raises the question of why a constrained entrepreneur at t  1
would not instead target a lower technology level Bt  A 
t, which would be less
expensive given the assumption that the cost of innovating at a given rate is
proportional to the targeted technology level. In Aghion, Howitt, and Mayer-
Foulkes [2004] we answer the question by showing that this alternative would be
dominated, from the entrepreneur’s point of view, by the strategy of always
targeting the frontier. This relies on the fact that the innovation function 	 ˜ (n) has
an elasticity less than one, which in turn follows from the fact that the innovation
cost function n ˜(	) is strictly convex with n ˜(0)  0.
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As in other Schumpeterian models, we suppose that the
growth rate g of the global technology frontier is determined by
the pace of innovations in the leading countries, none of which are
assumed to be credit-constrained. For simplicity, assume that
there is just one leader, labeled country 1. Then
g  	* 1  
11  1
1
,
where 
0 is a spillover coefﬁcient and the subscript 1 indicates
a parameter value in country 1.
III. THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS
III.A. Three Dynamic Patterns
In general, the country’s technology gap at will evolve accord-
ing to the unconstrained dynamical system (7) when at  a ()
and according to the constrained system (10) when at  a ().
Thus,
att  Hat  minH1at, H2at.
Note that H1 is a linear function with positive vertical intercept
and a slope between 0 and 1. Also,
20 H2 is an increasing concave
function when at  min{a (), 1}, with H2(0)  0 and
(11) H 20 

 
1
1  g .
Countries will fall into three groups, deﬁned by the level of
ﬁnancial development . The evolution of the technology gap is
illustrated for each case in Figures I–III below.
1. Convergence in growth rate, no marginal effect of ﬁnancial
development.
When ﬁnancial development is sufﬁciently high that
n*/a*  ,
so that a*  a (), then as shown in Figure I, at will
converge asymptotically to the unconstrained steady
state a* 
 0. Per-capita GDP will be given by equation
20. See footnote 15 above.
185 FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND CONVERGENCE(8) in the long run, which implies that the country will
grow at the same rate g as the global technology frontier
in the long run. Increases in ﬁnancial development will
have no marginal effect on either the steady-state
growth rate or the steady-state technology gap; these
converge, respectively, to the values g and a* which are
independent of .
21
2. Convergence in growth rate with a level-effect of ﬁnancial
development.
When the level of ﬁnancial development is neither too
high nor too low, so that
22
g
1  g   
n*
a* ,
21. That differences in the credit multiplier  within this high ﬁnancial-
development range do not affect the long-run technological gap results from the
fact that the incentive constraint underlying  (see Appendix 1) only places an
upper bound on the amount borrowed by the entrepreneur. As soon as this
constraint ceases to bind, then  becomes irrelevant in determining the dynamics
of productivity. A different model of credit constraints, e.g., one that would rely on
ex ante moral-hazard considerations and a continuous effort choice, might gen-
erate the possibility that differences in ﬁnancial development always affect long-
run productivity.
22. Note that
g
1  g

n*
a*
because
g/1  g
n*/a*

g	*
n*g  	*

	*
n*

	*
	*  	*
2/2
 1.
FIGURE I
A Country with the Highest Level of Financial Development
186 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICSthen H(a*)  H1(a*), so at cannot converge to the uncon-
strained steady state a*. From (11) we have
H0 

 
1
1  g 
g
1  g 
1
1  g  1.
Therefore, as shown in Figure II, at will converge to a
limit a ˆ that is strictly positive (except in the borderline
case where g/(1  g) and a ˆ  0) but less than a*. In
the long run, per-capita GDP will be
(12) Y ˆ
t  1  a ˆ  	 ˜ a ˆA 
t  Y* t.
This country will also grow at the rate g in the long run,
because ˆ Yt is strictly proportional to A 
t,a si sY* t. Increases in
ﬁnancial development will have no marginal effect on the
steady-state growth rate, but they will have a positive mar-
ginal effect on the steady-state technology gap a ˆ, because
they shift the curve H2(at) up in Figure II.
23 According to
(12), increases in ﬁnancial development will also have a
positive effect on the country’s steady-state per-capita GDP
because of both the direct effect on 	 ˜ and the indirect effect
working through a ˆ.
23. Formally, from (10),
at1

 at	 ˜ at1 
at
1  g  0.
FIGURE II
A Country with a Medium Level of Financial Development
187 FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND CONVERGENCE3. Divergence in growth rate, with a growth-effect of ﬁnancial
development.
When the level of ﬁnancial development is sufﬁciently low that
  g/1  g,
then H(a*)  H1(a*) and H(0)  1, so at will converge to
zero, as shown in Figure III. The following argument
shows that in this case the rate of productivity growth,
deﬁned as Gt  At1/At  1, will approach a limiting
value that is strictly between 0 and g. By l’Ho ˆpital’s rule
lim
t3 
at1
at  lim
a30
Ha 

 
1
1  g  0,1.
Therefore,
lim
t3
Gt  1  g lim
t3 
at1
at  1  1  g

  0,g.
Thus, the steady-state growth rate will be strictly less than
the frontier growth rate g and will be strictly increasing in
the country’s level of ﬁnancial development.
24
III.B. Summary
In summary, the two main implications of our theory are that
1. The likelihood that a country will converge to the frontier
growth rate increases with its level of ﬁnancial develop-
ment, and
2. in a country that converges to the frontier growth rate,
ﬁnancial development has a positive but eventually van-
ishing effect, ceteris paribus, on the steady-state level of
per-capita GDP relative to the frontier.
IV. CREDIT AND CONVERGENCE:E VIDENCE
In this section we confront our theoretical predictions with
evidence. After describing our data, we test implications 1 and 2
above with a cross-country growth regression involving an inter-
action term between the log of initial GDP per capita and ﬁnan-
24. Aghion, Howitt, and Mayer-Foulkes [2004] show that per-capita GDP
grows at the same asymptotic rate as productivity in this case.
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25 This test provides strong evidence for our
model and for the general proposition that whether or not a
country converges to the frontier growth rate depends on its level
of ﬁnancial development.
IV.A. Data
We do not have a direct empirical measure of the parameter
 or  which our theory takes as an indicator of ﬁnancial devel-
opment. Instead, we follow the usual practice of using a measure
of ﬁnancial intermediation to proxy for ﬁnancial development. We
analyze cross-sectional data
26 on 71 countries over the period
1960–1995, taken from Levine, Loayza, and Beck [2000] (LLB)
who found a strongly positive and robust effect of ﬁnancial inter-
mediation on short-run growth in a regression with initial GDP
on the right-hand side. We follow LLB in using private credit as
our preferred measure of ﬁnancial development. This is the value
of credits by ﬁnancial intermediaries to the private sector, divided
by GDP. It is LLB’s preferred measure because it excludes credit
granted to the public sector and credit granted by the central
25. We do not pursue a panel-data approach because we believe that ﬁnancial
development is imperfectly measured and persistent, which means that its growth
effects are likely to be underestimated by a panel-data approach relative to a
cross-section approach [Hauk and Wacziarg 2004]. This may explain why Ben-
habib and Spiegel [1997, 2000] found no signiﬁcant interaction between initial
GDP and ﬁnancial development using panel data on 92 countries from 1960 to
1985.
26. See Appendix 2 for a detailed description and sources of data.
FIGURE III
A Country with the Lowest Level of Financial Development
189 FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND CONVERGENCEbank and development banks. We also report results below using
alternative measures.
Figures IV and V show that the raw data are roughly con-
sistent with implications 1 and 2. Figure IV plots the average
growth rate of per-capita GDP over the sample period against the
average level of ﬁnancial development over the period. Except for
the countries with the three highest growth rates, which are
clearly above their steady-state values, the scatter diagram ap-
pears consistent with a positive effect of ﬁnancial development on
growth that vanishes at approximately Greece’s level of ﬁnancial
development (39 percent), as predicted by the implication 1. Fig-
ure V plots the average log of per-capita GDP on the vertical axis.
It appears consistent with a positive effect of ﬁnancial develop-
ment on the level of GDP which vanishes once ﬁnancial develop-
ment has reached approximately Canada’s level (61 percent), as
predicted by implication 2.
FIGURE IV
Average Financial Development and Growth Rate of Per-Capita GDP,
1960–1995
190 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICSThese ﬁgures do not control for the effects of initial GDP or
any other possible inﬂuences on a country’s growth path. Nor do
they deal with the problem of possible endogeneity of ﬁnancial
development. For these we turn to the following regression
results.
IV.B. Growth Regression with an Interaction Term
Our theoretical model can be approximated by the following
growth regression:
27
(13) gi  g1  0  fFi  y  yi  y1
 fy  Fi  yi  y1  xXi  εi,
where g denotes the average growth rate of per-capita GDP, F the
average level of ﬁnancial development, y the initial (1960) log of
per-capita GDP, X a set of other regressors and ε a disturbance
27. See Appendix C of our [2004] working paper for the details of the
approximation.
FIGURE V
Average Financial Development and Log of Per-Capita GDP, 1960–1995
191 FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND CONVERGENCEterm with mean zero. Country 1 is the technology leader, which
we take to be the United States. This is a standard growth
regression except for the interaction term Fi  (yi  y1).
Deﬁne y ˆi  yi  y1, country i’s initial relative per-capita GDP.
Under the assumption that y  fyFi  0, we can rewrite (13) as
gi  g1  i  y ˆi  y ˆ* i,
where the steady-state value y ˆ* i is deﬁned by setting the right-
hand side of (13) to zero:
(14) y ˆ* i  
0  fFi  xXi  εi
y  fyFi
and i is a country-speciﬁc convergence parameter:
(15) i  y  fyFi
that depends on ﬁnancial development.
A country can converge to the frontier growth rate if and only
if the growth rate of its relative per-capita GDP depends nega-
tively on the initial value y ˆi; that is, if and only if the convergence
parameter i is negative. Thus, the likelihood of convergence will
increase with ﬁnancial development (implication 1 above) if and
only if
(16) fy  0.
Since this implication constitutes the central proposition of our
theoretical model, our main objective in estimating (13) will be to
see whether or not the estimated interaction coefﬁcient is indeed
signiﬁcantly negative.
It follows from (14) that the long-run effect of ﬁnancial de-
velopment on relative output is
(17)
y ˆ* i
Fi

f  fyy ˆ* i
y  fyFi.
Assume that all countries lag the United States in steady state:
y ˆ* i  0. Then if (16) holds, ﬁnancial development will have a
positive long-run effect on per-capita GDP of each (nonleader)
country that converges if and only if f  0. For then the numer-
ator of (17) will be positive. Moreover, this effect will eventually
vanish (when F reaches the leader’s level) if and only if the direct
effect is equal to zero:
(18) f  0.
192 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICSSo if we were to ﬁnd that (18) held in addition to our main
prediction (16), this would corroborate implication 2. If instead
we were to ﬁnd that f 
 0, then the estimated effect of ﬁnancial
development on y ˆ* i would never vanish, even for the leader,
whereas f  0 would imply a negative effect for countries close
to the leader.
IV.C. Regression Results
The ﬁnancial development variable F in (13) may be endoge-
nous because of feedback from growth to ﬁnance, or because of the
common effects of omitted variables on both growth and ﬁnance.
Moreover, endogeneity of F is likely to entail endogeneity of the
interaction variable F  (y  y1). To deal with this problem, we
estimated (13) using instrumental variables, instrumenting for F
and F  (y  y1) using legal origins (L) and legal origins inter-
acted with initial relative output (L  (y  y1)).
Legal origins is a set of three zero-one variables, used ﬁrst in
the economics literature by La Porta et al. [1997, 1998] and
further extended to all 71 countries by LLB, indicating whether
the country’s legal system is based on French, English, or Ger-
man traditions (the omitted case is Scandinavian). La Porta et al.
argue that the main effect of L is on the rights of investors and
creditors. LLB conclude that L constitutes a good set of instru-
ments for ﬁnancial development because they were established
too long ago to suffer from reverse causation, they have a strong
effect on ﬁnancial development and their main effects on growth
should be through ﬁnancial channels. We used the interacted
variables L  (y  y1) as additional instruments to model the
interaction term F  (y  y1), because using L without L  (y 
y1) resulted in too much collinearity between the ﬁtted values of
F and F  (y  y1) to identify the crucial coefﬁcients f and fy.
We defer further discussion of the instruments until the next
section.
Our main results are presented in the ﬁrst column of Table I,
which reports the slope-coefﬁcient estimates for the case where
there are no other regressors X. These results show that ﬁnancial
development interacted with initial relative output has a signiﬁ-
cantly negative effect (fy  0.061  0), bearing out the main
implication of the theory to the effect that convergence depends
positively on ﬁnancial development. They also fail to reject the
hypothesis that the direct effect of ﬁnancial development f is
193 FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND CONVERGENCEzero, thus bearing out our theoretical implication of a positive but
vanishing steady-state effect.
28
These ﬁndings are signiﬁcant quantitatively as well as sta-
tistically, because they imply that countries will indeed belong to
28. The wide conﬁdence intervals for f are also consistent with a quantita-
tively large direct effect of ﬁnancial development, although as pointed out below
the point estimate of f indicates that for most converging countries the effect will
be quantitatively quite small.
TABLE I
GROWTH,F INANCIAL DEVELOPMENT, AND INITIAL GDP GAP
Estimation of equation: g  g1  0  f F  y(y  y1)  fyF(y  y1)  xX
Conditioning
set (X)
123456
Private credit Liquid liabilities
Empty Policy
a Full
b Empty Policy
a Full
b
Coefﬁcient
estimates
f 0.015 0.013 0.016 0.029 0.030 0.027
(0.93) (0.68) (0.78) (1.04) (0.99) (0.90)
y 1.507*** 1.193* 1.131 2.648*** 2.388** 2.384**
(3.14) (1.86) (1.49) (3.12) (2.39) (2.11)
fy 0.061*** 0.063*** 0.063*** 0.076*** 0.077*** 0.073***
(5.35) (5.10) (4.62) (3.68) (3.81) (3.55)
Instrument test
p-values
1st-stage
F-test: F 0.0000 0.0014 0.0024 0.0044 0.0032 0.0042
1st-stage
F-test:
F(y  y1) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0690 0.0078 0.0088
1st-stage
F-test:
L(y  y1) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0003 0.0002 0.0022
Sargan test 0.5372 0.7255 0.5573 0.2217 0.3952 0.3627
C-test for
L(y  y1) 0.3773 0.7013 0.4654 0.2700 0.3549 0.2799
C-test for
(y  y1) 0.6475 0.7790 0.7781 0.6240 0.6341 0.6226
Sample size 71 63 63 71 63 63
194 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICSdifferent convergence clubs. Speciﬁcally, a country can converge
to the frontier growth rate if and only if its convergence parame-
ter (15) is negative; that is, if and only if its level of private credit
exceeds the critical value
F
c  y/fy,
which according to our estimates equals 25 percent. Just over half
the countries in our sample (37 of 71) exceed this critical value.
TABLE I
(CONTINUED)
7 8 9 10 11 12
Bank assets Commercial-central bank
Empty Policy
a Full
b Empty Policy
a Full
b
0.019 0.020 0.022 0.000 0.031 0.013
(1.07) (1.03) (1.12) (0.00) (0.17) (0.07)
1.891*** 1.335* 1.365 7.166 5.279 5.645
(3.57) (1.93) (1.66) (1.04) (0.73) (0.72)
0.081*** 0.081*** 0.081*** 0.110 0.100 0.102
(5.07) (4.85) (4.46) (1.29) (1.18) (1.14)
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.2654 0.2180 0.1704
0.0010 0.0003 0.0011 0.5160 0.2743 0.2962
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.2329 0.2315 0.4516
0.8486 0.8816 0.8279 0.9661 0.8861 0.9223
0.9940 0.9642 0.8424 0.9482 0.7680 0.8240
0.7699 0.9944 0.9784 0.9700 0.9818 0.9320
71 63 63 71 63 63
The dependent variable g  g1 is the average growth rate of per-capita real GDP relative to the United
States, 1960–1995. F is the average Financial Development 1960–1995 using four alternative measures, and
y  y1 is the log of per-capita GDP in 1960 relative to the United States. Appendix 2 gives a detailed
description of all variables and indicates sources. Estimation is by IV using L (legal origins) and L(y  y1)
as instruments for F and F(y  y1). The numbers in parentheses are t-statistics. Signiﬁcance at the 1
percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent level is denoted by ***, **, and *, respectively.
a. The Policy conditioning set includes average years of schooling in 1960 (school), government size (gov),
inﬂation (pi), black market premium (bmp), and openness to trade (trade).
b. The Full conditioning set includes the Policy set plus indicators of revolutions and coups (revc),
political assassinations (assass), and ethnic diversity (avelf).
195 FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND CONVERGENCEFigure VI shows the estimated convergence parameter as a func-
tion of private credit, over the observed range of F, with two-
standard-deviation bands. As indicated in Table II, the estimated
parameter is at least two standard deviations below zero for 30
countries, the group most likely to converge in growth rate, and
two standard deviations above zero for 7 countries, those most
likely to diverge. The average estimated convergence parameter
in the sample is 0.82, which implies an annual convergence rate
of almost 5 percent.
Another measure of the economic signiﬁcance of our parame-
ter estimates is the size of the implied effect of ﬁnancial develop-
ment on a converging country’s steady-state relative output. As
predicted by implication 2 of our theoretical analysis, this effect is
a diminishing function of ﬁnancial development. Speciﬁcally, a
one-standard-deviation increase in private credit (28 percentage
points) would raise steady-state GDP by 21 percent in Belgium,
the (estimated) converging country with the smallest level of
private credit. But the effect would be less than 8 percent in every
other converging country, and less than 1 percent for each of the
30 “most likely to converge” countries.
The next two columns of Table I show that our results are
robust to the inclusion of other regressors. Speciﬁcally, column 2
FIGURE VI
Estimated Convergence Parameter over the Observed Range of Private Credit
(Positive values imply nonconvergence.)
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CONVERGENCE CLUB MEMBERSHIP
12 3
Countries most
likely to
converge in
growth rate
Countries uncertain
to converge in
growth rate
Countries most
likely to
diverge in
growth rate
Switzerland Iceland Liberia
Japan Venezuela Syrian Arab Republic
United States Trinidad & Tobago Nepal
Sweden Chile Haiti
Netherlands Senegal Ghana
Norway Philippines Sierra Leone
Germany Belgium* Zaire
France Jamaica
South Africa Mauritius
Korea Honduras
Austria Fiji
Spain Zimbabwe
Cyprus Mexico
Canada El Salvador
Italy Kenya
Taiwan Colombia
Portugal Togo
Australia Costa Rica
Finland Brazil
Ireland Uruguay
Thailand Papua New Guinea
Malaysia
United Kingdom
Pakistan
Malta
Guyana
Denmark
India
Barbados
Dominican Republic
Panama
New Zealand
Ecuador
Israel
Sri Lanka
Greece
Argentina
Paraguay
Bangladesh
Peru
Guatemala
Bolivia
Niger
Financial development decreases, and hence the estimated convergence parameter increases, as you
move down each list and then to the right. * The estimated convergence parameter is negative (indicating
convergence) in countries above (and including) Belgium and positive (indicating divergence) in countries
below Belgium.
197 FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND CONVERGENCEuses LLB’s policy conditioning set, which includes average years
of schooling in 1960, government size, inﬂation, the black market
exchange-rate premium, and openness to trade. Column 3 uses
their full conditioning set, which includes the policy conditioning
set plus measures of political stability and ethnic diversity. As
these two columns indicate, the sign, size, and signiﬁcance of the
crucial coefﬁcients f and fy remain virtually unchanged across
alternative conditioning sets.
The remaining columns report the results when three alter-
native measures of ﬁnancial development are used. The ﬁrst is
liquid liabilities, which is currency plus demand and interest-
bearing liabilities of banks and nonbank ﬁnancial intermediaries,
divided by GDP. This is a commonly used measure of ﬁnancial
development, although it includes liabilities backed by credits to
the public sector and may involve double counting. The second
alternative measure is bank assets, the ratio of all credits by
banks (but not other ﬁnancial intermediaries) to GDP. The third
is commercial-central bank, the ratio of commercial bank assets
to the sum of commercial plus central bank assets, which has
been used by others although it is not so much a measure of
ﬁnancial development as a measure of what fraction of credit is
issued by private intermediaries. Our main results (fy  0 and
f  0) are robust to all three alternative measures, although in
the case of commercial-central bank (our least preferred measure
ex ante) the coefﬁcient estimates all lose their statistical signiﬁ-
cance. As in the case of private credit, in all three cases the sign,
size, and signiﬁcance of the crucial coefﬁcients f and fy remain
virtually unchanged across alternative conditioning sets.
29
We checked the robustness of our results against outliers by
removing all countries with a residual more than three standard
deviations from zero and then reestimating. We also did this
using two standard deviations instead of three. We did this for
each of the ﬁrst nine cases in Table I. The coefﬁcient fy never
changed sign, and its statistical signiﬁcance was always even
larger than reported in Table I, while f was never signiﬁcantly
different from zero. Thus, it seems that the results reported in
Table I are not driven by outliers.
29. Although our theory does not rule out nonﬁnancial determinants of
steady-state output and growth, the fact that our estimated effects of ﬁnancial
development are independent of other conditioning variables suggests that we can
safely treat the inﬂuence of those other determinants as part of the error term in
the equations with empty conditioning sets.
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We tested the strength of our instruments with the usual
F-tests of joint signiﬁcance in the ﬁrst-stage regressions of F and
F  (y  y1). The p-values reported in the ﬁrst two rows of the
lower panel of Table I indicate that the instruments passed this
test at the 1 percent level in all three equations involving private
credit, our preferred measure of ﬁnancial development, in all
equations involving bank assets and in all but one involving
liquid liabilities. The instruments passed at the 10 percent sig-
niﬁcance level in all equations not involving commercial-central
bank. Because of our a priori doubts as to the suitability of the
commercial-central bank measure, we believe that the other
three measures are telling us the right message.
These results conﬁrm and extend similar ﬁndings by LLB.
However, we have added to their analysis the three interacted
instruments L  (y  y1), and it is important that they have
additional explanatory power. Accordingly, the third row of the
lower panel of Table I reports the p-value of an F-test of the
hypothesis that all three interacted instruments are insigniﬁcant
in both ﬁrst-stage regressions. The hypothesis is rejected at the 1
percent level in all equations except those using the suspect
commercial-central bank measure. Thus, our addition of the in-
teracted instruments does not appear to have created a “many-
instruments” problem.
From here on we omit the commercial-central bank measure
from our analysis, on the grounds that for our purposes it is a
priori inferior to the other measures and behaves empirically very
differently from the others.
To be valid, our legal-origins instruments must not affect
growth through any channel other than ﬁnance, since otherwise
the effects we are attributing to ﬁnance might actually be effects
of these nonﬁnancial channels. This restriction might appear
questionable because, for example, different legal systems could
result in different regulatory environments that affect barriers to
entry as argued by Djankov et al. [2000]. Therefore, we tested the
restriction using the standard Sargan test, whose null hypothesis
is that the instruments are uncorrelated with the IV residuals. If
our instruments were affecting growth through an omitted non-
ﬁnancial variable, then the Sargan test should reject the null.
However, the large p-values reported in the fourth row of the
199 FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND CONVERGENCElower panel of Table I show that the instruments pass the test in
all cases.
Again, these results conﬁrm and extend the ﬁndings of LLB
with respect to the three main instruments L. We tested the
speciﬁc validity of our interacted instruments L  (y  y1) with a
C-test. The large p-values in the ﬁfth row of the lower panel of
Table I indicate that the instruments pass this test in all cases.
The large p-values in the sixth row indicated that we also cannot
reject the exogeneity of initial relative income.
Another way to test for instrument validity is to include in
the equation those variables that represent the alternative non-
ﬁnancial channels through which the instruments might affect
growth. If these nonﬁnancial channels are at work, then the new
regressors should rob our ﬁnancial variables of explanatory
power. To some extent, the results of Table I already constitute
such a test, but the conditioning sets there do not include any
interaction terms between the extra regressors and initial rela-
tive output. So they leave open the possibility that our main
result, the strong negative effect on growth of the interaction
between ﬁnancial development and initial relative output, is com-
ing from the explanatory power of the interacted instruments L 
(y  y1) and that this explanatory power derives from correlation
between the interacted instruments and some omitted interacted
variable.
Table V provides strong evidence that this theoretical possi-
bility is not what is driving our results. As we explain in more
detail below, Table V reports the estimates that result from
including each of a long list of alternative regressors, including
one that measures regulatory entry barriers, both directly and
interacted with initial relative output. But in no case does the
inclusion affect our main results, and in no case does the alter-
native regressor or its interaction have signiﬁcant explanatory
power. If our legal-origins instruments are working through some
nonﬁnancial channel, then it must be one that cannot be mea-
sured or has not been brought to our attention.
Our ﬁnal check on instrument validity was to reestimate
Table I using alternative instruments. Speciﬁcally, we used the
log of settler mortality, which Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson
[2001] have argued is a good instrument for modern institutions
in formerly colonized countries. To model the interacted ﬁnancial
development variable, we also used the log of settler mortality
200 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICSinteracted with initial relative output as a second instrument.
The results are displayed in Table III.
This reestimation produces support for our main hypotheses
(fy  0 and f  0), because the estimated fy is always
negative and the estimate of f is always statistically indistin-
guishable from zero. The statistical signiﬁcance of fy is generally
much lower than in Table I, but we attribute this largely to the
smaller sample size. Data on settler mortality are available only
for 41 ex-colonies in our 71-country data set.
We prefer to work mainly with our legal-origins instruments
rather than settler mortality because we do not want to throw 30
countries out of our data set and because in this data set the
settler mortality instruments have relatively little explanatory
power for the two ﬁnancial development variables, as indicated
by the large p-values of the ﬁrst-stage F-tests in the lower panel
of Table III, especially when there is a nonempty set of condition-
ing variables.
30
In summary, we believe that the effects of ﬁnancial develop-
ment on convergence that we ﬁnd empirically are not artifacts of
our use of legal-origins instruments, because the instruments
pass standard statistical tests, the effects are robust to control-
ling for alternative channels through which legal origins might
inﬂuence growth, and to the extent that data limitations permit,
we have reproduced our main results using alternative
instruments.
31
IV.E. Productivity
As a further test of our theory, we examined whether the
effects of F and F  (y  y1) on per-capita GDP growth were work
through productivity growth, as implied by the theory, instead of
working just through capital accumulation.
32 Speciﬁcally, we re-
estimated the basic growth equation (13) using productivity
30. Beck, Demirgu ¨c ¸-Kunt, and Levine [2003] and Acemoglu and Johnson
[2003] ﬁnd that settler mortality is a stronger instrument than legal origins for
ﬁnancial development. This may be partly because they do not include in their
equations initial GDP, which in our analysis robs settler mortality of much of its
explanatory power.
31. We found the same results using as instruments the initial (1960) value
F0 of ﬁnancial development and F0  (y  y1). The only exception was the case
using liquid liabilities with the full conditioning set, where the p-value of the
interaction coefﬁcient rose to 0.12.
32. Our procedure follows closely that of King and Levine [1993a] and Beck,
Levine, and Loayza [2000], who used a similar framework without the interaction
terms.
201 FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND CONVERGENCET
A
B
L
E
I
I
I
E
S
T
I
M
A
T
I
O
N
U
S
I
N
G
L
O
G
S
E
T
T
L
E
R
M
O
R
T
A
L
I
T
Y
A
S
I
N
S
T
R
U
M
E
N
T
E
s
t
i
m
a
t
i
o
n
o
f
e
q
u
a
t
i
o
n
:
g

g
1


0


f
F


y
(
y

y
1
)


f
y
F
(
y

y
1
)


x
X
F
i
n
a
n
c
i
a
l
d
e
v
e
l
o
p
m
e
n
t
(
F
)
C
o
n
d
i
t
i
o
n
i
n
g
s
e
t
(
X
)
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
P
r
i
v
a
t
e
c
r
e
d
i
t
L
i
q
u
i
d
l
i
a
b
i
l
i
t
i
e
s
B
a
n
k
a
s
s
e
t
s
E
m
p
t
y
P
o
l
i
c
y
a
F
u
l
l
b
E
m
p
t
y
P
o
l
i
c
y
a
F
u
l
l
b
E
m
p
t
y
P
o
l
i
c
y
a
F
u
l
l
b
C
o
e
f
ﬁ
c
i
e
n
t
e
s
t
i
m
a
t
e
s

f

0
.
0
0
6

0
.
0
1
5
0
.
0
5
6

0
.
0
3
9

0
.
1
2
1

0
.
1
2
7

0
.
0
1
0

0
.
0
5
2
0
.
0
4
3
(

0
.
1
6
)
(

0
.
1
5
)
(
0
.
3
2
)
(

0
.
8
0
)
(

1
.
3
1
)
(

1
.
0
1
)
(

0
.
1
6
)
(

0
.
4
1
)
(
0
.
1
9
)

y
1
.
6
6
6
*
0
.
5
6
0

0
.
6
7
0
2
.
3
1
3
*
*
3
.
3
3
7
*
3
.
7
4
5
1
.
9
8
0
*
0
.
9
4
7

0
.
1
3
9
(
1
.
8
5
)
(
0
.
3
4
)
(

0
.
2
6
)
(
2
.
1
7
)
(
1
.
7
6
)
(
1
.
5
2
)
(
1
.
8
0
)
(
0
.
5
9
)
(

0
.
0
6
)

f
y

0
.
0
9
1
*
*
*

0
.
0
9
6
*

0
.
0
8
0

0
.
0
6
2
*
*

0
.
1
1
6
*
*

0
.
1
2
6
*

0
.
0
9
3
*
*

0
.
1
0
7
*

0
.
0
8
3
(

3
.
0
3
)
(

1
.
7
6
)
(

1
.
3
3
)
(

2
.
3
4
)
(

2
.
1
8
)
(

1
.
9
1
)
(

2
.
4
8
)
(

1
.
7
2
)
(

1
.
0
6
)
I
n
s
t
r
u
m
e
n
t
t
e
s
t
p
-
v
a
l
u
e
s
c
1
s
t
-
s
t
a
g
e
F
-
t
e
s
t
:
F
0
.
0
0
2
0
0
.
2
4
7
1
0
.
5
5
8
9
0
.
0
0
0
7
0
.
1
5
3
8
0
.
2
9
1
5
0
.
0
0
1
7
0
.
1
0
3
3
0
.
3
2
8
3
1
s
t
-
s
t
a
g
e
F
-
t
e
s
t
:
F
(
y

y
1
)
0
.
0
0
4
3
0
.
0
7
5
0
0
.
0
7
1
7
0
.
0
0
1
2
0
.
2
2
4
9
0
.
3
0
9
3
0
.
0
0
2
5
0
.
0
4
1
2
0
.
0
4
7
7
S
a
m
p
l
e
s
i
z
e
4
1
3
8
3
8
4
1
3
8
3
8
4
1
3
8
3
8
T
h
e
d
e
p
e
n
d
e
n
t
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
g

g
1
i
s
t
h
e
a
v
e
r
a
g
e
g
r
o
w
t
h
r
a
t
e
o
f
p
e
r
-
c
a
p
i
t
a
r
e
a
l
G
D
P
r
e
l
a
t
i
v
e
t
o
t
h
e
U
n
i
t
e
d
S
t
a
t
e
s
,
1
9
6
0
–
1
9
9
5
.
F
i
s
a
v
e
r
a
g
e
F
i
n
a
n
c
i
a
l
D
e
v
e
l
o
p
m
e
n
t
1
9
6
0
–
1
9
9
5
u
s
i
n
g
t
h
r
e
e
a
l
t
e
r
n
a
t
i
v
e
m
e
a
s
u
r
e
s
,
a
n
d
y

y
1
i
s
t
h
e
l
o
g
o
f
p
e
r
-
c
a
p
i
t
a
G
D
P
i
n
1
9
6
0
r
e
l
a
t
i
v
e
t
o
t
h
e
U
n
i
t
e
d
S
t
a
t
e
s
.
A
p
p
e
n
d
i
x
2
g
i
v
e
s
a
d
e
t
a
i
l
e
d
d
e
s
c
r
i
p
t
i
o
n
o
f
a
l
l
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
s
a
n
d
i
n
d
i
c
a
t
e
s
s
o
u
r
c
e
s
.
E
s
t
i
m
a
t
i
o
n
i
s
b
y
I
V
u
s
i
n
g
t
h
e
l
o
g
o
f
s
e
t
t
l
e
r
m
o
r
t
a
l
i
t
y
a
n
d
t
h
e
l
o
g
o
f
s
e
t
t
l
e
r
m
o
r
t
a
l
i
t
y
t
i
m
e
s
(
y

y
1
)
a
s
i
n
s
t
r
u
m
e
n
t
s
f
o
r
F
a
n
d
F
(
y

y
1
)
.
T
h
e
n
u
m
b
e
r
s
i
n
p
a
r
e
n
t
h
e
s
e
s
a
r
e
t
-
s
t
a
t
i
s
t
i
c
s
.
S
i
g
n
i
ﬁ
c
a
n
c
e
a
t
t
h
e
1
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
,
5
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
,
a
n
d
1
0
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
l
e
v
e
l
i
s
d
e
n
o
t
e
d
b
y
*
*
*
,
*
*
,
a
n
d
*
,
r
e
s
p
e
c
t
i
v
e
l
y
.
a
.
T
h
e
P
o
l
i
c
y
c
o
n
d
i
t
i
o
n
i
n
g
s
e
t
i
n
c
l
u
d
e
s
a
v
e
r
a
g
e
y
e
a
r
s
o
f
s
c
h
o
o
l
i
n
g
i
n
1
9
6
0
(
s
c
h
o
o
l
)
,
g
o
v
e
r
n
m
e
n
t
s
i
z
e
(
g
o
v
)
,
i
n
ﬂ
a
t
i
o
n
(
p
i
)
,
b
l
a
c
k
m
a
r
k
e
t
p
r
e
m
i
u
m
(
b
m
p
)
,
a
n
d
o
p
e
n
n
e
s
s
t
o
t
r
a
d
e
(
t
r
a
d
e
)
.
b
.
T
h
e
F
u
l
l
c
o
n
d
i
t
i
o
n
i
n
g
s
e
t
i
n
c
l
u
d
e
s
t
h
e
P
o
l
i
c
y
s
e
t
p
l
u
s
i
n
d
i
c
a
t
o
r
s
o
f
r
e
v
o
l
u
t
i
o
n
s
a
n
d
c
o
u
p
s
(
r
e
v
c
)
,
p
o
l
i
t
i
c
a
l
a
s
s
a
s
s
i
n
a
t
i
o
n
s
(
a
s
s
a
s
s
)
,
a
n
d
e
t
h
n
i
c
d
i
v
e
r
s
i
t
y
(
a
v
e
l
f
)
.
c
.
O
n
l
y
t
w
o
o
f
t
h
e
f
o
u
r
i
n
s
t
r
u
m
e
n
t
t
e
s
t
s
o
f
T
a
b
l
e
I
c
a
n
b
e
p
e
r
f
o
r
m
e
d
b
e
c
a
u
s
e
t
h
e
r
e
a
r
e
o
n
l
y
a
s
m
a
n
y
s
e
t
t
l
e
r
-
m
o
r
t
a
l
i
t
y
i
n
s
t
r
u
m
e
n
t
s
a
s
e
n
d
o
g
e
n
o
u
s
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
s
,
n
a
m
e
l
y
2
.
202 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICSgrowth as the dependent variable instead of growth in per-capita
GDP, and interpreting y as the log of aggregate productivity in
1960 instead of the log of per-capita GDP. We took our produc-
tivity variable from Benhabib and Spiegel [2005]. The results are
presented in Table IV.
These results are similar to what we obtained using per-
capita GDP. Speciﬁcally, the crucial interaction coefﬁcient fa is
still negative and signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level in all equa-
tions, with magnitudes similar to Table I. Also the coefﬁcient f of
F remains not signiﬁcantly different from zero, except in the case
of speciﬁcation 4, where it is signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level. As
before, the results are stable across conditioning sets, and our
legal-origins instruments continue to pass the tests for strength
and validity.
IV.F. Alternative Explanations of Divergence
Perhaps what prevents poor countries from converging in
growth rate is not lack of ﬁnancial development but lack of
education, or perhaps ﬁnancial development matters for growth
only because it facilitates investment in schooling, as in Galor
and Zeira [1993]. Or maybe divergence is explained by some other
variable that is associated with a low initial level of GDP, or with
a low level of private credit.
33 Table V addresses these questions
by checking whether the effect of ﬁnance on convergence is robust
to including a possible effect of initial relative output, schooling,
or a host of other variables on convergence.
Speciﬁcally, we included as an additional regressor the
square of initial relative output, (y  y1)
2. If this term were to
have a signiﬁcant negative coefﬁcient yy, it might indicate that
what keeps poor countries from joining the convergence club is
just being poor to start with, or something other than ﬁnance that
is correlated with being poor to start with. Next we included as
additional regressors not (y  y1)
2 but the variable school—
average years of schooling in 1960—and also the interaction term
school  (y  y1). If the latter were to have a signiﬁcant negative
coefﬁcient, it might indicate that lack of education is what keeps
33. Another interpretation of our ﬁnding of a negative interaction coefﬁcient
fy is that entrepreneurs in poor countries have relatively few alternatives to
borrowing from ﬁnancial intermediaries because of weak or nonexistent equity
and bond markets. To the extent that weak equity and bond markets are a
by-product of weak investor protection, the same factor that our theory is focusing
on, this alternative interpretation is complementary with ours.
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204 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICSpoor countries from joining the convergence club, for the same
reason that a negative interaction effect with ﬁnancial develop-
ment indicates that lack of ﬁnance is what keeps them from
converging. We repeated the same procedure with 31 other vari-
ables that have been suggested in the literature. These include
alternative schooling variables, geographical variables, variables
measuring population health, policy variables, variables indexing
the degree of sociopolitical stability, and a list of eleven institu-
tional variables.
If our results were fragile, if the main determinant of con-
vergence were not ﬁnancial development but something else that
was just correlated with ﬁnancial development, or if our legal
instruments were working on growth and convergence primarily
through some channel other than ﬁnancial development, then the
addition of at least some of these variables and their interaction
with initial relative output should destroy the explanatory power
of F  (y  y1) in our growth regression, or make the coefﬁcient
f on F signiﬁcantly different from zero. But the results of Table
V show otherwise. The estimated sign of the coefﬁcient fy re-
mains negative in all cases, and statistically signiﬁcant in all
cases except when the alternative variable is settler mortality, a
case in which, as mentioned above, the number of observations is
very small.
34
According to Table V, in all cases the coefﬁcient f of F
remains not signiﬁcantly different from zero when these alterna-
tive variables are included in the regression. Moreover, in no case
was the interaction between an alternative variable and initial
relative output statistically signiﬁcant. The lower panel of Table
V indicates that our instruments remained strong and that they
continued to pass the Sargan test.
To guard against the possibility that these results are an
artifact of some powerful but unexplained effect of the interacted
legal-origins instruments on growth, we redid all the estimations
of Table V using OLS. This reestimation again conﬁrmed our
34. We explored this single exception further by pooling the 41 ex-colonies
with the others. We set settler mortality equal to the New Zealand value (the
lowest in the data) for all non-ex-colonies and included in the regression a dummy
for non-ex-colony and an interaction between this dummy and initial relative
output. This formulation assumes that being an ex-colony has an effect on growth
and convergence but not on the growth effects of having more ﬁnancial develop-
ment. The results are displayed in the last column of Table V. They conﬁrm our
main predictions, and suggest that the only exception in Table V to the ﬁnding of
a signiﬁcantly negative interaction coefﬁcient may indeed be attributable to a
small sample size.
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208 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICSmain theoretical results; the coefﬁcient f on F was never signiﬁ-
cantly different from zero, and the interaction coefﬁcient fy in all
cases was negative and statistically signiﬁcant except when the
alternative variable was settler mortality.
To the same end, and also to take into account the possibility
that some of the alternative regressors X are endogenous to the
growth regression, we followed the suggestion of an anonymous
referee to reestimate Table V instrumenting for the X’s and the
interacted X  (y  y1) variables instead of for private credit and
private credit interacted. If the interaction coefﬁcient fy were to
lose its signiﬁcance and the coefﬁcient of some X  (y  y1) were
to show up as signiﬁcant in this “switched” IV regression, this
would suggest that the effects we have been attributing to the
interaction between ﬁnance and the initial GDP gap were really
attributable to the effect of our legal origins instruments working
through some channel other than ﬁnance.
The results shown in Table VI indicate that our earlier ﬁnd-
ings pass this test. In only one case (state history) is the coefﬁ-
cient of the interaction variable X  (y  y1) signiﬁcant at the 10
percent level in the switched IV regression, and in that case the
critical interaction coefﬁcient fy retained its signiﬁcance at the 1
percent level. Although in several other cases fy lost its statis-
tical signiﬁcance, this only happened when our legal origins in-
struments turned out to have little explanatory power in the
ﬁrst-stage regressions for X  (y  y1), being jointly insigniﬁcant
at the 10 percent level; since weak instruments are known to
produce unreliable and imprecise IV estimates
35 we do not inter-
pret this loss of signiﬁcance as casting doubt on our theoretical
predictions. However, it does perhaps provide a clue for under-
standing our otherwise surprisingly robust results.
More speciﬁcally, most of the loss in signiﬁcance of fy in
Table VI occurs when X represents an institutional variable.
36
This is probably because the interacted forms of these variables,
and especially their ﬁtted values from the ﬁrst-stage regression,
are highly correlated with the interacted private credit variable
(see columns 2 and 3, Table VII), which makes it hard econometri-
cally to identify their effects on growth separately from those of
35. See, for example, Davidson and MacKinnon [2004, p. 329].
36. Speciﬁcally, our main predictions (insigniﬁcant f and signiﬁcantly nega-
tive fy) were conﬁrmed in the case of 18 of the 22 noninstitutional variables but
only in 3 of the 11 institutional variables.
209 FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND CONVERGENCET
A
B
L
E
V
I
T
E
S
T
F
O
R
O
T
H
E
R
I
N
T
E
R
A
C
T
I
O
N
S
—
S
W
I
T
C
H
E
D
I
V
R
E
G
R
E
S
S
I
O
N
S
E
s
t
i
m
a
t
i
o
n
o
f
e
q
u
a
t
i
o
n
:
g

g
1


0


y
(
y

y
1
)


f
F


f
y
F
(
y

y
1
)


x
X


x
y
X
(
y

y
1
)
C
a
t
e
g
o
r
y
O
t
h
e
r
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
(
X
)
y

y
1
a
S
c
h
o
o
l
i
n
g
G
e
o
g
r
a
p
h
y
s
c
h
o
o
l
s
e
c
h
y
g
s
c
h
o
o
l
g
h
y
a
f
r
e
q
.
d
i
s
t
.
p
o
p
1
0
0
c
r
t
r
o
p
o
p
C
o
e
f
ﬁ
c
i
e
n
t
e
s
t
i
m
a
t
e
s

f

0
.
0
2
5

0
.
0
6
4

0
.
0
2
6

0
.
0
0
4

0
.
0
3
3

0
.
0
0
5

0
.
0
0
4

0
.
0
0
5

0
.
0
0
9

0
.
0
2
3
(

1
.
2
2
)
(

1
.
2
4
)
(

0
.
6
2
)
(

0
.
3
1
)
(

1
.
5
2
)
(

0
.
5
0
)
(

0
.
1
9
)
(

0
.
3
6
)
(

0
.
4
8
)
(

0
.
9
1
)

f
y

0
.
0
5
9
*
*
*

0
.
1
1
3
*

0
.
0
6
0

0
.
0
3
8
*
*
*

0
.
0
6
9
*
*
*

0
.
0
3
5
*
*
*

0
.
0
4
0
*
*

0
.
0
3
0
*

0
.
0
4
5
*
*

0
.
0
3
5
*
*
(

3
.
6
5
)
(

1
.
8
2
)
(

1
.
1
9
)
(

3
.
1
4
)
(

3
.
6
7
)
(

3
.
9
0
)
(

2
.
3
4
)
(

1
.
9
6
)
(

2
.
0
3
)
(

2
.
4
3
)

x
3
.
3
2
5
0
.
1
2
3
0
.
4
5
2

0
.
9
3
9
0
.
5
2
0
0
.
2
5
1
2
.
5
3
2

0
.
2
5
7
1
.
3
7
3

4
.
0
7
3
(
1
.
1
5
)
(
0
.
2
9
)
(
0
.
3
7
)
(

0
.
3
5
)
(
0
.
4
6
)
(
0
.
2
1
)
(
0
.
3
7
)
(

0
.
0
7
)
(
0
.
2
5
)
(

0
.
7
9
)

x
y
0
.
5
4
2
0
.
9
4
1
0
.
7
9
8

2
.
8
6
5

0
.
2
1
2

0
.
7
8
5
1
.
4
8
3

4
.
3
3
0
0
.
6
0
2
0
.
1
7
5
(
0
.
7
0
)
(
1
.
0
7
)
(
0
.
3
3
)
(

1
.
0
2
)
(

0
.
4
1
)
(

1
.
2
1
)
(
0
.
6
3
)
(

1
.
0
6
)
(
0
.
2
1
)
(
0
.
0
8
)
I
n
s
t
r
u
m
e
n
t
t
e
s
t
p
-
v
a
l
u
e
s
1
s
t
-
s
t
a
g
e
F
-
t
e
s
t
:
X
0
.
0
0
0
0
0
.
0
0
1
1
0
.
3
5
3
4
0
.
0
0
0
0
0
.
4
2
4
5
0
.
0
1
5
4
0
.
9
8
8
6
0
.
0
0
6
8
0
.
9
5
2
9
0
.
6
8
7
2
1
s
t
-
s
t
a
g
e
F
-
t
e
s
t
:
X
(
y

y
1
)
0
.
0
0
0
0
0
.
9
0
1
2
0
.
9
9
1
0
0
.
0
9
7
5
0
.
6
6
6
7
0
.
0
2
6
2
0
.
9
6
5
9
0
.
4
2
2
9
0
.
9
7
0
1
0
.
3
5
5
3
1
s
t
-
s
t
a
g
e
F
-
t
e
s
t
:
L
(
y

y
1
)
0
.
0
0
0
0
0
.
0
0
0
6
0
.
7
7
2
0
0
.
0
0
0
0
0
.
0
2
3
4
0
.
0
0
5
0
0
.
5
7
3
6
0
.
5
6
0
7
0
.
8
8
6
7
0
.
2
0
4
5
S
a
r
g
a
n
t
e
s
t
0
.
2
4
5
6
0
.
9
4
5
0
0
.
3
8
9
4
0
.
1
6
2
8
0
.
8
9
6
6
0
.
8
4
6
5
0
.
1
1
8
6
0
.
6
4
5
0
0
.
0
9
2
6
0
.
9
8
1
3
C
-
t
e
s
t
f
o
r
L
(
y

y
1
)
0
.
1
5
0
0
0
.
8
6
9
2
0
.
3
0
5
6
0
.
1
0
3
0
0
.
8
1
8
7
0
.
7
3
0
8
0
.
3
1
4
8
0
.
9
3
8
2
0
.
0
6
7
9
0
.
9
3
9
6
C
-
t
e
s
t
f
o
r
(
y

y
1
)
0
.
7
8
1
9
0
.
4
4
4
1
0
.
5
0
0
1
0
.
8
7
7
0
0
.
8
2
1
4
0
.
4
6
4
0
0
.
8
9
2
9
0
.
4
4
6
0
0
.
9
3
6
0
S
a
m
p
l
e
s
i
z
e
7
1
7
1
6
9
7
0
7
1
7
0
7
1
7
0
6
7
6
7
T
h
e
d
e
p
e
n
d
e
n
t
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
g

g
1
i
s
t
h
e
a
v
e
r
a
g
e
g
r
o
w
t
h
r
a
t
e
o
f
p
e
r
-
c
a
p
i
t
a
r
e
a
l
G
D
P
r
e
l
a
t
i
v
e
t
o
t
h
e
U
n
i
t
e
d
S
t
a
t
e
s
,
1
9
6
0
–
1
9
9
5
.
F
i
s
a
v
e
r
a
g
e
P
r
i
v
a
t
e
C
r
e
d
i
t
1
9
6
0
–
1
9
9
5
,
y

y
1
i
s
t
h
e
l
o
g
o
f
p
e
r
-
c
a
p
i
t
a
G
D
P
i
n
1
9
6
0
r
e
l
a
t
i
v
e
t
o
t
h
e
U
n
i
t
e
d
S
t
a
t
e
s
,
s
c
h
o
o
l
i
s
a
v
e
r
a
g
e
y
e
a
r
s
o
f
s
c
h
o
o
l
i
n
g
i
n
1
9
6
0
,
s
e
c
i
s
a
v
e
r
a
g
e
y
e
a
r
s
o
f
s
e
c
o
n
d
a
r
y
e
d
u
c
a
t
i
o
n
1
9
6
0
–
1
9
9
5
,
h
y
i
s
t
h
e
K
l
e
n
o
w
-
R
o
d
r
i
g
u
e
z
-
C
l
a
r
e
r
a
t
i
o
o
f
h
u
m
a
n
c
a
p
i
t
a
l
t
o
o
u
t
p
u
t
,
g
s
c
h
o
o
l
i
s
a
v
e
r
a
g
e
g
r
o
w
t
h
r
a
t
e
o
f
y
e
a
r
s
o
f
s
c
h
o
o
l
i
n
g
1
9
6
0
–
1
9
9
5
,
g
h
y
i
s
t
h
e
a
v
e
r
a
g
e
g
r
o
w
t
h
r
a
t
e
o
f
t
h
e
h
u
m
a
n
c
a
p
i
t
a
l
r
a
t
i
o
1
9
6
0
–
1
9
8
5
,
a
f
r
i
s
a
n
A
f
r
i
c
a
n
d
u
m
m
y
,
e
q
.
d
i
s
t
.
i
s
d
i
s
t
a
n
c
e
f
r
o
m
t
h
e
e
q
u
a
t
o
r
,
p
o
p
1
0
0
c
r
i
s
m
e
a
s
u
r
e
o
f
a
c
c
e
s
s
t
o
o
c
e
a
n
-
n
a
v
i
g
a
b
l
e
w
a
t
e
r
w
a
y
s
,
a
n
d
t
r
o
p
o
p
i
s
t
h
e
f
r
a
c
t
i
o
n
o
f
p
o
p
u
l
a
t
i
o
n
l
i
v
i
n
g
i
n
t
h
e
t
r
o
p
i
c
s
.
A
p
p
e
n
d
i
x
2
g
i
v
e
s
a
d
e
t
a
i
l
e
d
d
e
s
c
r
i
p
t
i
o
n
o
f
a
l
l
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
s
a
n
d
i
n
d
i
c
a
t
e
s
s
o
u
r
c
e
s
.
E
s
t
i
m
a
t
i
o
n
i
s
b
y
I
V
u
s
i
n
g
L
(
l
e
g
a
l
o
r
i
g
i
n
s
)
a
n
d
L
(
y

y
1
)
a
s
i
n
s
t
r
u
m
e
n
t
s
f
o
r
X
a
n
d
X
(
y

y
1
)
.
T
h
e
n
u
m
b
e
r
s
i
n
p
a
r
e
n
t
h
e
s
e
s
a
r
e
t
-
s
t
a
t
i
s
t
i
c
s
.
S
i
g
n
i
ﬁ
c
a
n
c
e
a
t
t
h
e
1
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
,
5
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
,
a
n
d
1
0
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
l
e
v
e
l
i
s
d
e
n
o
t
e
d
b
y
*
*
*
,
*
*
,
a
n
d
*
,
r
e
s
p
e
c
t
i
v
e
l
y
.
a
.
W
h
e
n
t
h
e
o
t
h
e
r
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
X
i
s
(
y

y
1
)
,
t
h
e
e
s
t
i
m
a
t
e
d
e
q
u
a
t
i
o
n
i
s
g

g
1


0


f
F


f
y
F
(
y

y
1
)


x
(
y

y
1
)


x
y
(
y

y
1
)
2
.
210 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICST
A
B
L
E
V
I
T
E
S
T
F
O
R
O
T
H
E
R
I
N
T
E
R
A
C
T
I
O
N
S
—
S
W
I
T
C
H
E
D
I
V
R
E
G
R
E
S
S
I
O
N
S
(
C
O
N
T
I
N
U
E
D
)
E
s
t
i
m
a
t
i
o
n
o
f
e
q
u
a
t
i
o
n
:
g

g
1


0


y
(
y

y
1
)


f
F


f
y
F
(
y

y
1
)


x
X


x
y
X
(
y

y
1
)
C
a
t
e
g
o
r
y
O
t
h
e
r
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
(
X
)
H
e
a
l
t
h
P
o
l
i
c
y
S
o
c
i
o
p
o
l
i
t
i
c
a
l
s
t
a
b
i
l
i
t
y
a
v
g
m
o
r
t
a
v
g
e
x
p
e
c
t
m
e
t
r
a
d
e
b
u
s
.
r
e
g
.
g
o
v
b
m
p
p
i
s
o
e
a
v
e
l
f
r
e
v
c
a
s
s
a
s
s
C
o
e
f
ﬁ
c
i
e
n
t
e
s
t
i
m
a
t
e
s

f

0
.
0
5
0

0
.
0
2
0

0
.
0
1
7

0
.
0
0
7

0
.
0
1
9

0
.
0
1
0

0
.
0
3
4

0
.
0
0
7

0
.
0
1
7

0
.
0
2
0

0
.
0
2
0

0
.
0
2
0
(

0
.
6
8
)
(

0
.
5
5
)
(

0
.
5
5
)
(

0
.
6
0
)
(

0
.
8
7
)
(

0
.
7
8
)
(

0
.
8
8
)
(

0
.
3
3
)
(

0
.
7
3
)
(

1
.
1
5
)
(

1
.
0
9
)
(

1
.
3
3
)

f
y

0
.
1
1
4

0
.
0
7
0

0
.
0
6

0
.
0
4
6
*
*
*

0
.
0
6
1
*

0
.
0
4
2
*
*
*

0
.
0
7
2
*
*
*

0
.
0
4
0
*
*
*

0
.
0
5
3
*
*
*

0
.
0
5
6
*
*
*

0
.
0
4
8
*
*
*

0
.
0
5
0
*
*
*
(

1
.
0
4
)
(

1
.
8
1
)
(

1
.
6
0
)
(

5
.
4
9
)
(

1
.
9
6
)
(

3
.
5
0
)
(

3
.
3
4
)
(

2
.
9
5
)
(

3
.
1
0
)
(

3
.
5
1
)
(

3
.
9
4
)
(

5
.
0
2
)

x
0
.
0
1
7

0
.
2
6
0
0
.
8
6
5
0
.
0
3
0
0
.
2
5
9

0
.
0
7
4

0
.
0
6
8
0
.
0
3
6

0
.
0
4
2

2
.
6
9
8

3
.
6
4
3
2
.
6
9
6
(
0
.
5
0
0
)
(

0
.
5
1
)
(
0
.
8
5
)
(
0
.
5
6
)
(
0
.
1
7
)
(

0
.
4
3
)
(

0
.
5
9
)
(
0
.
3
9
)
(

0
.
0
6
)
(

0
.
4
3
)
(

0
.
4
1
)
(
0
.
5
1
)

x
y

0
.
0
1
6
0
.
0
0
4
0
.
2
4
6
0
.
0
1
0
0
.
6
9
3

0
.
1
5
9

0
.
0
4
2
0
.
0
3
5
0
.
3
0
8

1
.
8
9
4

0
.
4
7
7
3
.
3
2
6
(

0
.
5
6
)
(
0
.
0
2
)
(
0
.
9
6
)
(
0
.
3
4
)
(
0
.
4
8
)
(

0
.
9
3
)
(

0
.
8
0
)
(
0
.
6
4
)
(
0
.
7
0
)
(

0
.
5
5
)
(

0
.
0
8
)
(
0
.
7
6
)
I
n
s
t
r
u
m
e
n
t
t
e
s
t
p
-
v
a
l
u
e
s
1
s
t
-
s
t
a
g
e
F
-
t
e
s
t
:
X
0
.
8
7
6
7
0
.
9
2
2
8
0
.
9
8
1
8
0
.
2
5
6
4
0
.
4
9
4
7
0
.
0
0
8
8
0
.
3
8
5
5
0
.
4
5
5
5
0
.
4
4
9
8
0
.
3
2
6
7
0
.
5
1
1
3
0
.
2
5
1
4
1
s
t
-
s
t
a
g
e
F
-
t
e
s
t
:
X
(
y

y
1
)
0
.
9
6
9
9
0
.
6
1
8
6
0
.
8
7
9
4
0
.
2
0
0
4
0
.
9
3
0
6
0
.
4
1
4
5
0
.
3
2
0
5
0
.
4
6
9
6
0
.
5
9
1
2
0
.
5
1
9
0
0
.
6
8
4
8
0
.
6
2
4
4
1
s
t
-
s
t
a
g
e
F
-
t
e
s
t
:
L
(
y

y
1
)
0
.
4
2
2
5
0
.
7
2
8
2
0
.
1
0
0
8
0
.
6
8
2
6
0
.
2
6
5
9
0
.
0
0
6
6
0
.
8
5
1
3
0
.
6
0
7
2
0
.
6
9
7
7
0
.
9
8
9
4
0
.
9
1
5
4
0
.
8
1
9
1
S
a
r
g
a
n
t
e
s
t
0
.
9
9
7
2
0
.
8
9
6
4
0
.
8
8
3
7
0
.
2
1
9
2
0
.
4
0
0
0
0
.
5
3
7
3
0
.
9
9
8
0
0
.
2
2
6
9
0
.
7
8
7
4
0
.
2
8
5
7
0
.
2
8
3
2
0
.
7
2
9
0
C
-
t
e
s
t
f
o
r
L
(
y

y
1
)
0
.
9
8
5
2
0
.
8
3
4
1
0
.
8
4
4
7
0
.
2
1
8
7
0
.
3
6
0
1
0
.
5
1
3
4
0
.
9
9
8
1
0
.
1
5
2
2
0
.
7
7
2
9
0
.
3
6
7
1
0
.
3
4
8
5
0
.
6
0
8
1
C
-
t
e
s
t
f
o
r
(
y

y
1
)
0
.
8
8
8
7
0
.
7
9
7
2
0
.
6
2
2
2
0
.
4
4
9
9
0
.
6
3
8
3
0
.
6
5
2
1
0
.
8
8
2
6
0
.
5
4
7
2
0
.
6
2
3
4
0
.
5
0
0
4
0
.
6
3
5
7
0
.
8
1
0
5
S
a
m
p
l
e
s
i
z
e
6
4
6
4
6
7
6
6
6
6
6
4
6
7
7
1
6
6
7
1
7
1
7
1
T
h
e
d
e
p
e
n
d
e
n
t
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
g

g
1
i
s
t
h
e
a
v
e
r
a
g
e
g
r
o
w
t
h
r
a
t
e
o
f
p
e
r
-
c
a
p
i
t
a
r
e
a
l
G
D
P
r
e
l
a
t
i
v
e
t
o
t
h
e
U
n
i
t
e
d
S
t
a
t
e
s
,
1
9
6
0
–
1
9
9
5
.
F
i
s
a
v
e
r
a
g
e
P
r
i
v
a
t
e
C
r
e
d
i
t
1
9
6
0
–
1
9
9
5
,
y

y
1
i
s
t
h
e
l
o
g
o
f
p
e
r
-
c
a
p
i
t
a
G
D
P
i
n
1
9
6
0
r
e
l
a
t
i
v
e
t
o
t
h
e
U
n
i
t
e
d
S
t
a
t
e
s
,
a
v
g
m
o
r
t
i
s
a
v
e
r
a
g
e
c
h
i
l
d
m
o
r
t
a
l
i
t
y
1
9
7
0
–
1
9
9
0
,
a
v
g
e
x
p
e
c
t
i
s
a
v
e
r
a
g
e
l
i
f
e
e
x
p
e
c
t
a
n
c
y
a
t
b
i
r
t
h
1
9
6
0
–
1
9
9
0
,
m
e
i
s
m
a
l
a
r
i
a
e
c
o
l
o
g
y
,
t
r
a
d
e
i
s
o
p
e
n
n
e
s
s
t
o
t
r
a
d
e
,
b
u
s
.
r
e
g
.
i
s
a
n
(
i
n
v
e
r
s
e
)
i
n
d
e
x
o
f
t
h
e
r
e
g
u
l
a
t
o
r
y
p
r
o
b
l
e
m
s
i
n
v
o
l
v
e
d
i
n
o
p
e
n
i
n
g
a
b
u
s
i
n
e
s
s
,
g
o
v
i
s
g
o
v
e
r
n
m
e
n
t
s
i
z
e
,
b
m
p
i
s
t
h
e
b
l
a
c
k
m
a
r
k
e
t
p
r
e
m
i
u
m
,
p
i
i
s
t
h
e
a
v
e
r
a
g
e
i
n
ﬂ
a
t
i
o
n
r
a
t
e
1
9
6
0
–
1
9
9
5
,
s
o
e
i
s
a
n
i
n
d
e
x
o
f
s
t
a
t
e
-
o
w
n
e
d
e
n
t
e
r
p
r
i
s
e
s
,
a
v
e
l
f
i
s
a
n
i
n
d
e
x
o
f
e
t
h
n
o
l
i
n
g
u
i
s
t
i
c
f
r
a
c
t
i
o
n
a
l
i
z
a
t
i
o
n
,
r
e
v
c
i
s
a
n
i
n
d
i
c
a
t
o
r
o
f
r
e
v
o
l
u
t
i
o
n
s
a
n
d
c
o
u
p
s
,
a
n
d
a
s
s
a
s
s
i
s
a
m
e
a
s
u
r
e
o
f
p
o
l
i
t
i
c
a
l
a
s
s
a
s
s
i
n
a
t
i
o
n
s
.
A
p
p
e
n
d
i
x
2
g
i
v
e
s
a
d
e
t
a
i
l
e
d
d
e
s
c
r
i
p
t
i
o
n
o
f
a
l
l
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
s
a
n
d
i
n
d
i
c
a
t
e
s
s
o
u
r
c
e
s
.
E
s
t
i
m
a
t
i
o
n
i
s
b
y
I
V
u
s
i
n
g
L
(
l
e
g
a
l
o
r
i
g
i
n
s
)
a
n
d
L
(
y

y
1
)
a
s
i
n
s
t
r
u
m
e
n
t
s
f
o
r
X
a
n
d
X
(
y

y
1
)
.
T
h
e
n
u
m
b
e
r
s
i
n
p
a
r
e
n
t
h
e
s
e
s
a
r
e
t
-
s
t
a
t
i
s
t
i
c
s
.
S
i
g
n
i
ﬁ
c
a
n
c
e
a
t
t
h
e
1
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
,
5
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
,
a
n
d
1
0
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
l
e
v
e
l
i
s
d
e
n
o
t
e
d
b
y
*
*
*
,
*
*
,
a
n
d
*
,
r
e
s
p
e
c
t
i
v
e
l
y
.
211 FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND CONVERGENCET
A
B
L
E
V
I
T
E
S
T
F
O
R
O
T
H
E
R
I
N
T
E
R
A
C
T
I
O
N
S
—
S
W
I
T
C
H
E
D
I
V
R
E
G
R
E
S
S
I
O
N
S
(
C
O
N
T
I
N
U
E
D
)
E
s
t
i
m
a
t
i
o
n
o
f
e
q
u
a
t
i
o
n
:
g

g
1


0


y
(
y

y
1
)


f
F


f
y
F
(
y

y
1
)


x
X


x
y
X
(
y

y
1
)
C
a
t
e
g
o
r
y
O
t
h
e
r
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
(
X
)
I
n
s
t
i
t
u
t
i
o
n
s
b
u
r
e
a
u
c
o
r
r
u
p
t
r
u
l
e
l
a
w
p
r
.
r
i
g
h
t
s
e
x
p
r
i
s
k
c
i
v
i
l
k
k
z
i
n
f
r
a
s
t
a
t
e
h
i
s
t
s
o
c
a
p
s
e
t
m
o
r
t
a
l
C
o
e
f
ﬁ
c
i
e
n
t
e
s
t
i
m
a
t
e
s

f

0
.
0
1
1

0
.
0
2
8

0
.
0
1
4
0
.
0
0
7

0
.
0
0
6

0
.
0
1
0

0
.
0
1
3

0
.
0
0
8

0
.
0
1
0

0
.
0
7
7
0
.
0
0
3
(

0
.
5
8
)
(

1
.
2
5
)
(

0
.
7
1
)
(
0
.
2
9
)
(

0
.
2
7
)
(

0
.
6
4
)
(

0
.
3
1
)
(

0
.
2
2
)
(

0
.
8
2
)
(

0
.
9
6
)
(

0
.
1
0
)

f
y

0
.
0
2
8

0
.
0
6
8
*
*

0
.
0
2
6
0
.
0
0
3

0
.
0
0
4

0
.
0
4
2
*
*
*

0
.
0
3
4

0
.
0
0
6

0
.
0
3
4
*
*
*

0
.
0
6
8

0
.
0
0
4
(

1
.
4
0
)
(

2
.
1
7
)
(

0
.
9
5
)
(
0
.
0
7
)
(

0
.
1
3
)
(

3
.
3
7
)
(

0
.
4
3
)
(

0
.
1
2
)
(

4
.
0
4
)
(

1
.
1
9
)
(

0
.
1
4
)

x
0
.
1
8
5
0
.
4
8
9
0
.
7
0
3
0
.
1
5
4
0
.
6
5
7

0
.
2
7
2
1
.
1
1
3
4
.
2
6
7

1
.
0
0
8
9
.
3
2
4

0
.
6
3
6
(
0
.
2
8
)
(
0
.
8
0
)
(
1
.
0
3
)
(
0
.
1
1
)
(
0
.
9
1
)
(

0
.
4
2
)
(
0
.
9
3
)
(
0
.
7
8
)
(

0
.
4
8
)
(
1
.
3
0
)
(

0
.
4
1
)

x
y

0
.
4
3
3
0
.
4
7
9

0
.
4
0
8

1
.
2
7
5

0
.
5
1
1
0
.
0
3
9

0
.
1
7
0

3
.
3
9
4

2
.
7
8
8
*
2
.
8
6
2
0
.
5
6
9
(

0
.
8
8
)
(
0
.
7
2
)
(

0
.
6
3
)
(

0
.
9
8
)
(

0
.
9
7
)
(
0
.
1
3
)
(

0
.
0
7
)
(

0
.
6
3
)
(

1
.
7
4
)
(
1
.
1
2
)
(
1
.
1
1
)
I
n
s
t
r
u
m
e
n
t
t
e
s
t
p
-
v
a
l
u
e
s
1
s
t
-
s
t
a
g
e
F
-
t
e
s
t
:
X
0
.
0
4
6
4
0
.
1
0
6
9
0
.
3
6
2
6
0
.
2
4
2
1
0
.
3
5
0
3
0
.
0
5
2
6
0
.
3
8
7
7
0
.
8
0
6
6
0
.
0
0
5
7
0
.
2
3
9
8
a
0
.
3
0
0
3
b
1
s
t
-
s
t
a
g
e
F
-
t
e
s
t
:
X
(
y

y
1
)
0
.
1
8
6
3
0
.
8
2
8
6
0
.
8
3
0
1
0
.
7
9
6
9
0
.
7
0
1
8
0
.
0
2
2
8
0
.
9
9
8
5
0
.
9
7
9
4
0
.
0
6
5
9
0
.
1
9
9
8
a
0
.
1
1
2
4
b
1
s
t
-
s
t
a
g
e
F
-
t
e
s
t
:
L
(
y

y
1
)
0
.
0
9
1
3
0
.
3
9
8
1
0
.
2
1
0
5
0
.
0
2
1
7
0
.
2
9
8
1
0
.
0
3
5
8
0
.
5
8
4
0
0
.
6
9
7
1
0
.
0
0
1
0
0
.
1
7
5
5
a
0
.
0
0
0
6
b
S
a
r
g
a
n
t
e
s
t
0
.
7
3
3
3
0
.
3
5
3
3
0
.
5
4
1
9
0
.
9
7
3
4
0
.
8
8
5
7
0
.
2
9
2
4
0
.
1
7
0
3
0
.
3
9
4
8
0
.
1
3
8
0
0
.
5
5
2
8
a
—
C
-
t
e
s
t
f
o
r
L
(
y

y
1
)
0
.
7
4
1
0
0
.
2
9
9
5
0
.
6
6
6
6
0
.
9
1
8
9
0
.
8
9
3
1
0
.
2
5
1
5
0
.
1
6
8
7
0
.
5
8
6
9
0
.
1
3
8
0
0
.
5
5
2
8
a
—
C
-
t
e
s
t
f
o
r
(
y

y
1
)
0
.
8
2
1
1
0
.
4
7
8
7
0
.
9
2
5
1
0
.
9
4
8
7
0
.
8
7
9
1
0
.
5
1
9
1
0
.
4
6
5
6
0
.
9
6
7
9
0
.
1
9
5
5
0
.
4
0
2
1
a
—
S
a
m
p
l
e
s
i
z
e
6
7
6
7
6
7
6
6
6
7
7
0
7
0
6
9
6
7
4
0
4
1
T
h
e
d
e
p
e
n
d
e
n
t
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
g

g
1
i
s
t
h
e
a
v
e
r
a
g
e
g
r
o
w
t
h
r
a
t
e
o
f
p
e
r
-
c
a
p
i
t
a
r
e
a
l
G
D
P
r
e
l
a
t
i
v
e
t
o
t
h
e
U
n
i
t
e
d
S
t
a
t
e
s
,
1
9
6
0
–
1
9
9
5
.
F
i
s
a
v
e
r
a
g
e
P
r
i
v
a
t
e
C
r
e
d
i
t
1
9
6
0
–
1
9
9
5
,
y

y
1
i
s
t
h
e
l
o
g
o
f
p
e
r
-
c
a
p
i
t
a
G
D
P
i
n
1
9
6
0
r
e
l
a
t
i
v
e
t
o
t
h
e
U
n
i
t
e
d
S
t
a
t
e
s
,
b
u
r
e
a
u
i
s
a
n
i
n
d
e
x
o
f
b
u
r
e
a
u
c
r
a
t
i
c
e
f
ﬁ
c
i
e
n
c
y
,
c
o
r
r
u
p
t
i
s
a
m
e
a
s
u
r
e
o
f
c
o
r
r
u
p
t
i
o
n
,
r
u
l
e
l
a
w
i
s
a
n
i
n
d
e
x
o
f
t
h
e
c
o
u
n
t
r
y
’
s
t
r
a
d
i
t
i
o
n
o
f
l
a
w
a
n
d
o
r
d
e
r
,
p
r
.
r
i
g
h
t
s
i
s
a
n
i
n
d
e
x
o
f
s
t
r
e
n
g
t
h
o
f
p
r
o
p
e
r
t
y
r
i
g
h
t
s
,
e
x
p
r
i
s
k
i
s
a
n
i
n
d
e
x
o
f
e
x
p
r
o
p
r
i
a
t
i
o
n
r
i
s
k
,
c
i
v
i
l
i
s
a
n
i
n
d
e
x
o
f
c
i
v
i
l
l
i
b
e
r
t
i
e
s
,
k
k
z
i
s
a
m
e
a
s
u
r
e
o
f
t
h
e
q
u
a
l
i
t
y
o
f
g
o
v
e
r
n
a
n
c
e
,
i
n
f
r
a
i
s
a
m
e
a
s
u
r
e
o
f
s
o
c
i
a
l
i
n
f
r
a
s
t
r
u
c
t
u
r
e
,
s
t
a
t
e
h
i
s
t
i
s
a
m
e
a
s
u
r
e
o
f
t
h
e
a
n
t
i
q
u
i
t
y
o
f
a
s
t
a
t
e
,
s
o
c
a
p
i
s
a
n
i
n
d
e
x
o
f
s
o
c
i
a
l
c
a
p
a
b
i
l
i
t
y
,
a
n
d
s
e
t
m
o
r
t
a
l
i
s
t
h
e
l
o
g
o
f
s
e
t
t
l
e
r
m
o
r
t
a
l
i
t
y
.
A
p
p
e
n
d
i
x
2
g
i
v
e
s
a
d
e
t
a
i
l
e
d
d
e
s
c
r
i
p
t
i
o
n
o
f
a
l
l
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
s
a
n
d
i
n
d
i
c
a
t
e
s
s
o
u
r
c
e
s
.
E
s
t
i
m
a
t
i
o
n
i
s
b
y
I
V
u
s
i
n
g
L
(
l
e
g
a
l
o
r
i
g
i
n
s
)
a
n
d
L
(
y

y
1
)
a
s
i
n
s
t
r
u
m
e
n
t
s
f
o
r
X
a
n
d
X
(
y

y
1
)
.
T
h
e
n
u
m
b
e
r
s
i
n
p
a
r
e
n
t
h
e
s
e
s
a
r
e
t
-
s
t
a
t
i
s
t
i
c
s
.
S
i
g
n
i
ﬁ
c
a
n
c
e
a
t
t
h
e
1
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
,
5
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
,
a
n
d
1
0
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
l
e
v
e
l
i
s
d
e
n
o
t
e
d
b
y
*
*
*
,
*
*
,
a
n
d
*
,
r
e
s
p
e
c
t
i
v
e
l
y
.
a
.
N
o
S
c
a
n
d
i
n
a
v
i
a
n
l
e
g
a
l
o
r
i
g
i
n
s
i
n
t
h
i
s
s
a
m
p
l
e
.
b
.
N
o
S
c
a
n
d
i
n
a
v
i
a
n
o
r
G
e
r
m
a
n
l
e
g
a
l
o
r
i
g
i
n
s
i
n
t
h
i
s
s
a
m
p
l
e
.
212 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICSthe interacted private credit variable.
37 This interpretation is
supported by the fact that in all but two cases with a relatively
small sample size we can reject the hypothesis that both inter-
acted variables have a zero effect at the 5 percent signiﬁcance
level using the switched regression results (see column 4, Table
VII). But it leaves open the possibility that what really matters
for convergence is some unspeciﬁed combination of ﬁnancial de-
velopment and other institutions, and that the effects of other
institutions have not shown up in the above results because of our
inability to ﬁnd appropriate instruments to correct for their
endogeneity.
38
Overall, we interpret the results of this section as further
evidence to the effect that lack of ﬁnancial development accounts
37. This is not independent of the weak instrument problem. When the legal
origins instruments have little explanatory power, the ﬁtted value of X  (y  y1)
is just a noisy linear combination of the other “exogenous” regressors in the
growth equation, including F  (y  y1).
38. For example, perhaps what matters most for convergence is well-
functioning markets, for which many institutional variables are a good indicator
but none better than ﬁnancial development. We have tried exploring the issue
further by instrumenting in the same equation for X, X  (y  y1), F and F  (y 
y1) but our inability to ﬁnd strong instruments for X and X  (y  y1) has
prevented us from shedding any further light on the question.
TABLE VII
PRIVATE CREDIT AND OTHER INSTITUTIONAL VARIABLES
Variable
Correlation
between X
and F
Correlation
between
X(y  y1)
and F(y 
y1)
Correlation
between
ﬁtted X(y
 y1) and
F(y  y1)
in switched
regression
P-value of F-test
for joint
signiﬁcance of
X(y  y1) and
F(y  y1)i n
switched
regression
12 3 4
bureau 0.7325 0.6752 0.7872 0.0000
corrupt 0.7053 0.6663 0.8303 0.0000
rulelaw 0.7138 0.6656 0.7996 0.0000
pr.rights 0.6273 0.5786 0.6491 0.0434
exprisk 0.7552 0.6032 0.6140 0.0272
civil 0.5701 0.1233 0.1819 0.0000
kkz 0.7251 0.3185 0.4051 0.0014
infra 0.7318 0.7130 0.9025 0.0165
statehist 0.4924 0.4716 0.6091 0.0000
socap 0.4399 0.3055 0.1831 0.3581
setmortal 0.6375 0.2052 0.0782 0.3111
213 FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND CONVERGENCEfor the failure of some countries to converge to the growth rate of
the global technology frontier, a further corroboration of our
theory, and a further indication of the validity of our legal-origins
instruments for ﬁnancial development. But we cannot rule out
the possibility that at least some of the failure to converge is also
attributable to institutional factors other than ﬁnance, or to some
other variable that is also endogenous to the growth process.
V. CONCLUSION
The paper has developed and tested a Schumpeterian model
of cross-country convergence with ﬁnancial constraints. The
model is consistent with the broad facts of convergence and di-
vergence since the early nineteenth century. It implies that all
countries above some critical level of ﬁnancial development
should converge in growth rate, and that in such countries ﬁnan-
cial development has a positive but eventually vanishing effect on
steady-state GDP. These implications were tested by estimating a
cross-country growth regression with an interaction term be-
tween ﬁnancial development and the country’s initial relative
output. As predicted, the coefﬁcient of this interaction term is
negative and highly signiﬁcant, and the direct effect of ﬁnancial
development is not signiﬁcantly different from zero.
Why some countries fail to converge in growth rates despite
the possibility of technology transfer has been a puzzle. In com-
bination with the contributions of Howitt [2000], Acemoglu,
Aghion, and Zilibotti [2002], and Howitt and Mayer-Foulkes
[2002] our theoretical results show that Schumpeterian growth
theory provides a framework for analyzing a variety of forces that
contribute to nonconvergence.
39 Our empirical results suggest
that ﬁnancial development is among the most powerful of these
forces, especially considering that educational attainment, initial
relative output, and a large number of other candidate variables
do not have an analogous effect when included in the same
regression with ﬁnancial development.
40
39. See Galor and Weil [2000], Gollin, Parente, and Rogerson [2002], and
Hansen and Prescott [2002] for alternative theories of convergence and divergence
based on the transition from agricultural to industrial technologies.
40. Our results also suggest that a country might escape divergence by using
foreign direct investment as a substitute for lending to local entrepreneurs.
However, the results of Alfaro et al. [2003] indicate that foreign direct investment
and local ﬁnance are complements. Speciﬁcally, they ﬁnd that foreign direct
investment has a signiﬁcant effect on growth only when interacted with ﬁnance.
214 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICSAPPENDIX 1: ENDOGENIZING THE CREDIT MULTIPLIER
This Appendix closely follows Aghion, Banerjee, and Piketty
[1999] in deriving a constant credit multiplier from ex post en-
forcement considerations. More precisely, suppose that at a non-
monetary cost cNt an entrepreneur can hide the result of a
successful innovation and thereby avoid repaying her creditors,
where 0  c  1. This cost is an indicator of the degree of creditor
protection. In countries where laws and institutions make fraud
a costly option, creditors are better protected, and therefore, as
we shall see, credit is more readily available to entrepreneurs.
The entrepreneur must pay the hiding cost at the beginning
of the period, when she decides whether or not to be dishonest.
She will do so when it is in her self-interest, namely when the
following incentive-compatibility constraint is violated:
(19) 	A 
t1  cNt  	A 
t1  	R  Nt  wt,
where R is the interest factor on the loan, Nt  wt is the size of
the loan, and
	  	 ˜ Nt/A 
t1
is the innovation probability. The left-hand side of (19) is the
expected payoff from deciding to be dishonest when investing at
the rate Nt, whereas the right-hand side is the expected payoff
from deciding to be honest. (If she does not successfully innovate,
her payoff is zero, because having invested all her wealth in the
unsuccessful project she cannot be made to repay anything.)
The only potential lenders in this OLG model are other young
people, who will lend only if offered an expected rate of return
equal to r 
1  1. Thus, the interest factor on the loan in
equilibrium must satisfy not only the incentive-compatibility con-
dition (19) but also the arbitrage condition
	R  1  r,
so that the incentive-compatibility condition boils down to an
upper limit on the entrepreneur’s investment:
This is consistent with the view that foreign direct investment results in technol-
ogy transfer only when complemented by the local entrepreneurial investments at
the heart of our theory, which investments are impeded by lack of ﬁnancial
development.
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1  r
1  r  c wt  wt,
where
1    .
APPENDIX 2: SOURCES AND DESCRIPTION OF DATA
setmortal: Log of European settler mortality, Acemoglu, John-
son, and Robinson [2001].
statehist: Measure of the antiquity of a state (1 to 1950 CE)
regarding the existence of native foreign government and the
extent of the territory ruled by this government. The measure
used corresponds to statehist5 of the database in Bockstette,
Chanda, and Putterman [2002].
avgexpect: Average life expectancy at birth for the years 1960–
1990, Children Data Bank for International.
socap: Measure of social capability derived by Adelman and
Morris [1967] using assessment of each country’s development as
of 1957–1962 in a variety of respects such as extent of urbaniza-
tion, extent of dualism, extent of social mobility, extent of liter-
acy, crude fertility rate, degree of modernization of outlook, char-
acter of basic social organization, extent of mass communication,
size of traditional agricultural sector and importance of indige-
nous middle class, Temple and Johnson [1998].
infra: Measure of social infrastructure (1986–1995) computed as
the average of the GADP and an openness measures. GADP is an
index of government antidiversion policies including law and
order, bureaucratic quality, corruption, risk of expropriation, and
government repudiation of contracts, Hall and Jones [1999].
avgmort: Average under-5 mortality rate for the years 1970–
1990, Children Data Bank for International.
pop100cr: Percentage of population within 100 km of ice-
free coast, CID at Harvard University. General Measures of
Geography.
tropop: Percentage of population in geographical tropics, CID at
Harvard University. General Measures of Geography.
kkz: Composite index of six dimensions of governance: voice and
accountability, political stability and absence of violence, govern-
ment effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, control of
corruption, Kaufmann, Kraay, and Zoido-Lobato ´n [1999a, 1999b].
216 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICSme: Malaria Ecology. An ecologically based variable that is pre-
dictive of the extent of malaria transmission [Kiszewski et al.
2004]. Malaria is intrinsically a disease of warm environments
because a key part of the life-cycle of the parasite (sporogony)
depends on a high ambient temperature. Malaria also depends on
adequate conditions of mosquito breeding, mainly pools of clean
water, usually due to rainfall ending up in puddles, cisterns,
discarded tires, and the like. Additionally, the intensity of ma-
laria transmission depends on the speciﬁc mosquito species that
are present. The basic formula for Malaria Ecology combines
temperature, mosquito abundance, and mosquito vector type. The
underlying index is measured on a highly disaggregated subna-
tional level, and then averaged for the entire country and
weighted by population, The Earth Institute at Columbia
University.
bureau: An index of the efﬁciency of the bureaucracy, ranging
from 1 (least efﬁcient) to 6 (most efﬁcient). The data are averaged
over the period 1992–1997. International Country Risk Guide
(ICRG) at http://www.countrydata/datasets/.
exprisk: Expropriation risk. Assessment of risk of “outright con-
ﬁscation” or “forced nationalization.” It ranges from 0 to 10, with
lower scores indicating a higher risk. The data are averaged over
the period 1992–1997. ICRG.
lat_abst: Distance from the equator scaled between 0 and 1, La
Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny [1998]—henceforth
LLSV.
pr. rights: Property rights. Rating of property rights on a scale
from 0 to 5. The more protection private property receives, the
higher the score, LLSV.
soe: Index of state-owned enterprises (SOE). Measures the role of
SOEs in the economy, ranging from 0 to 10. Higher scores denote
countries with fewer government-owned enterprises, which are
estimated to produce less of the country’s output, LLSV.
corruption: Measure of corruption, with the scale ranging from
1 (high level of corruption) to 6 (low level). The data are averaged
over the period 1992–1997. ICRG.
assass: Number of assassinations per 1000 inhabitants, averaged
over 1960–1990, Banks [1994].
revc: Revolutions and coups. A revolution is deﬁned as any illegal
or forced change in the top of the governmental elite, any attempt
at such a change, or any successful or unsuccessful armed rebel-
lion whose aim is independence from central government. Coup
217 FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND CONVERGENCEd’Etat is deﬁned as an extraconstitutional or forced change in the
top of the governmental elite or its effective control of the nation’s
power structure in a given year or both. Unsuccessful coups are
not counted. Data are averaged over 1960–1990, Banks [1994].
avelf: Ethnic fractionalization. Average value of ﬁve indices of
ethnolinguistic fractionalization, with values ranging from 0 to 1,
where higher values denote higher levels of fractionalization,
Easterly and Levine [1998].
rulelaw: Measure of the law and order tradition in a country. It
ranges from 10, strong law and order tradition, to 1, weak law
and order tradition. The data are averaged over the period 1992–
1997. ICRG.
bus. reg: Business regulation. Rating of regulation policies re-
lated to opening and keeping open a business. The scale is from 0
to 5, with higher scores meaning that regulations are straight-
forward and applied uniformly to all businesses and that regula-
tions are less of a burden to business, LLSV.
civil: Index of civil liberties, Freedom House 1994.
legal origins: Dummy variables for British (Eng), French (Fre),
German (Ger) and Scandinavian legal origins, LLSV.
private credit: {(0.5)*[F(t)/Pe(t)  F(t  1)/Pe(t  1)]}/
[GDP(t)/Pa(t)], where F is credit by deposit money bank and
other ﬁnancial institutions to the private sectors (lines 22d 
42d), GDP is line 99b, Pe is end- of period CPI (line 64) and Pa is
the average CPI for the year, IFS.
bank assets: {(0.5)*[F(t)/Pe(t)  F(t  1)/Pe(t  1)]}/[GDP(t)/
Pa(t)], where F is domestic assets of deposit money banks (lines
22a–d), GDP is line 99b, Pe is end-of-period CPI (line 64), and Pa
is the average CPI for the year, IFS.
liquid liabilities: {(0.5)*[F(t)/Pe(t)  F(t  1)/Pe(t  1)]}/
[GDP(t)/Pa(t)], where F is liquid liabilities (line 55), GDP is line
99b, Pe is end-of-period CPI (line 64), and Pa is the average CPI
for the year, IFS.
commercial-central bank: DBA(t)/(DBA(t)  CBA(t)), where
DBA is assets of deposit money banks (lines 22a–d) and CBA is
central bank assets (lines 12a–d), IFS.
bmp: Black market premium: Ratio of black market exchange
rate and ofﬁcial exchange rate minus one, Picks’ Currency Year-
book through 1989 and the World Currency Yearbook.
sec: Average years of secondary schooling in the population over
ﬁfteen from 1960–1995, Barro and Lee [1996].
218 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICSschool: Average years of schooling in the population over 25 in
1960, Barro and Lee [1996].
pi: Inﬂation rate. Log difference of consumer price index average
from 1960–1995, IFS (line 64).
trade: Openness to trade. Sum of real exports and imports as a
share of real GDP, average 1960–1995, Levine, Loayza, and Beck
[2000], henceforth LLB.
gov: Government expenditure as a share of GDP, average 1960–
1995, LLB.
africa: Dummy for countries in the African continent.
y  y1: Difference between log per-capita real GDP 1960 in each
country and the United States, LLB.
gschool: Average annual growth rate of schooling from 1960 to
1995, LLB.
hy: 1985 human-capital to output ratio, Klenow and Rodrı ´guez-
Clare [1997].
ghy: 1960–1985 annual growth rate of human capital to output
ratio, Klenow and Rodrı ´guez-Clare [1997].
lna  lna1: The log of productivity in 1960 relative to the United
States, Benhabib and Spiegel [2005].
HARVARD UNIVERSITY
BROWN UNIVERSITY
CENTRO DE INVESTIGACIO ´NYDOCENCIA ECONO ´MICAS,M E ´XICO
REFERENCES
Acemoglu, Daron, Philippe Aghion, and Fabrizio Zilibotti, “Distance to Frontier,
Selection and Economic Growth,” National Bureau of Economic Research
Working Paper No. 9066, July 2002.
Acemoglu, Daron, and Simon Johnson, “Unbundling Institutions,” mimeograph,
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, June 2003.
Acemoglu, Daron, Simon Johnson, and James A. Robinson, “The Colonial Origins
of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation,” American Eco-
nomic Review, XCI (2001), 1369–1401.
Acemoglu, Daron, and Fabrizio Zilibotti, “Productivity Differences,” Quarterly
Journal of Economics, CXVI (2001), 563–606.
Adelman, Irma, and Cynthia Taft Morris, Society, Politics and Economic Devel-
opment: A Quantitative Approach (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins Uni-
versity Press, 1967).
Aghion, Philippe, Abhijit V. Banerjee, and Thomas Piketty, “Dualism and Mac-
roeconomic Volatility,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, CXIV (1999),
1359–1397.
Aghion, Philippe, and Patrick Bolton, “A Model of Trickle-Down Growth and
Development,” Review of Economic Studies, LXIV (1997), 151–172.
Aghion, Philippe, and Peter Howitt, Endogenous Growth Theory (Cambridge, MA:
MIT Press, 1998).
Aghion, Philippe, Peter Howitt, and David Mayer-Foulkes, “The Effect of Finan-
cial Development on Convergence: Theory and Evidence,” National Bureau of
Economic Research Working Paper No. 10358, March 2004.
219 FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND CONVERGENCEAlfaro, Laura, Areendam Chanda, Sebnem Kalemli-Ozcan, and Selin Sayek, “FDI
and Economic Growth: The Role of Local Financial Markets,” mimeograph,
University of Houston, 2003.
Arrow, Kenneth J., “Classiﬁcatory Notes on the Production and Transmission of
Technological Knowledge,” American Economic Review, LIX (1969), 29–35.
Baily, Martin Neil, and Robert M. Solow, “International Productivity Compari-
sons Built from the Firm Level,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, XV (2001),
151–172.
Banerjee, Abhijit, “Contracting Constraints, Credit Markets and Economic Devel-
opment,” in Matthias Dewatripont, Lars-Peter Hansen, and Stephen J. Turn-
ovsky, eds., Advances in Economics and Econometrics (New York, NY: Cam-
bridge University Press, 2003).
Banerjee, Abhijit, and Andrew Newman, “Occupational Choice and the Process of
Development,” Journal of Political Economy, CI (1993), 274–298.
Banks, Arthur S., “Cross-National Time Series Data Archive,” Center for Social
Analysis, University of New York at Binghampton, 1994.
Barro, Robert J., and Jong-Wha Lee, “International Measures of Schooling Years
and Schooling Quality,” American Economic Review, LXXXVI (1996),
218–224.
Barro, Robert J., and Xavier Sala-i-Martin, “Convergence,” Journal of Political
Economy, C (1992), 223–251.
Barro, Robert J., and Xavier Sala-i-Martin, “Technological Diffusion, Conver-
gence, and Growth,” Journal of Economic Growth, II (1997), 1–26.
Basu, Susanto, and David N. Weil, “Appropriate Technology and Growth,” Quar-
terly Journal of Economics, CXIII (1998), 1025–1054.
Beck, Thorsten, Asli Demirgu ¨c ¸-Kunt, and Ross Levine, “Law, Endowments, and
Finance,” Journal of Financial Economics, LXX (2003), 137–181.
Beck, Thorsten, Ross Levine, and Norman Loayza, “Finance and the Sources of
Growth,” Journal of Financial Economics, LVIII (2000), 261–300.
Bencivenga, Valerie R., and Bruce D. Smith, “Financial Intermediation and En-
dogenous Growth,” Review of Economic Studies, LVIII (1991), 195–210.
Bencivenga, Valerie R., and Bruce D. Smith, “Some Consequences of Credit
Rationing in an Endogenous Growth Model,” Journal of Economic Dynamics
and Control, XVII (1993), 97–122.
Benhabib, Jess, and Mark M. Spiegel, “Cross-Country Growth Regressions,” New
York University Working Paper, 1997.
Benhabib, Jess, and Mark M. Spiegel, “The Role of Financial Development in
Growth and Investment,” Journal of Economic Growth, V (2000), 341–360.
Benhabib, Jess, and Mark M. Spiegel, “Human Capital and Technology Diffu-
sion,” in Philippe Aghion and Steven N. Durlauf, eds., Handbook of Economic
Growth (Amsterdam: Elsevier, 2005), forthcoming.
Bernanke, Ben, and Mark Gertler, “Agency Costs, Net Worth, and Business
Fluctuations,” American Economic Review, LXXIX (1989), 14–31.
Blackburn, Keith, and Victor T. Y. Hung, “A Theory of Growth, Financial Devel-
opment and Trade,” Economica, LXV (1998), 107–124.
Bockstette, Valerie, Areendam Chanda, and Louis Putterman, “States and Mar-
kets: The Advantage of an Early Start,” Journal of Economic Growth, VII
(2002), 347–369.
Cohen, Wesley M., and Daniel A. Levinthal, “Innovation and Learning: The Two
Faces of R&D,” Economic Journal, XCIX (1989), 569–596.
Davidson, Russell, and James G. MacKinnon, Econometric Theory and Methods
(New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2004).
De Gregorio, Jose ´, “Borrowing Constraints, Human Capital Accumulation, and
Growth,” Journal of Monetary Economics, XXXVII (1996), 49–71.
Demirgu ¨c ¸-Kunt, Asli, and Ross Levine, Financial Structure and Economic
Growth: A Cross-Country Comparison of Banks, Markets, and Development
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2001).
Djankov, Simeon, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, and Andrei Shlei-
fer, “The Regulation of Entry,” National Bureau of Economic Research Work-
ing Paper No. 7892, September 2000.
Easterly, William, and Ross Levine, “Troubles with the Neighbours: Africa’s
220 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICSProblems and Africa’s Opportunities,” Journal of African Economics, VII
(1998), 120–142.
Easterly, William, and Ross Levine, “It’s Not Factor Accumulation: Stylized Facts
and Growth Models,” World Bank Economic Review, XV (2001), 177–219.
Evans, Paul, “Using Cross-Country Variances to Evaluate Growth Theories,”
Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, XX (1996), 1027–1049.
Evenson, Robert E., and Larry E. Westphal, “Technological Change and Technol-
ogy Strategy,” in T. N. Srinivasan and Jere Behrman, eds., Handbook of
Development Economics, Vol. 3A (Amsterdam: Elsevier, 1995).
de la Fuente, Angel, and Jose ´ Maria Marin, “Innovation, Bank Monitoring, and
Endogenous Financial Development,” Journal of Monetary Economics, XX-
VIII (1996), 269–301.
Galetovic, Alexander, “Specialization, Intermediation, and Growth,” Journal of
Monetary Economics, XXVIII (1996), 549–559.
Galor, Oded, and David Weil, “Population, Technology, and Growth: From
Malthusian Stagnation to the Demographic Transition and Beyond,” Ameri-
can Economic Review, XC (2000), 806–828.
Galor, Oded, and Joseph Zeira, “Income Distribution and Macroeconomics,” Re-
view of Economic Studies, LX (1993), 35–52.
Gerschenkron, Alexander, “Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective,” in
Bert F. Hoselitz, ed., The Progress of Underdeveloped Areas (Chicago, IL:
University of Chicago Press, 1952).
Gollin, Douglas, Stephen Parente, and Richard Rogerson, “The Role of Agriculture
in Development,” American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings, XCII
(2002), 160–164.
Greenwood, Jeremy, and Boyan Jovanovic, “Financial Development, Growth, and
the Distribution of Income,” Journal of Political Economy, XCVIII (1990),
1076–1107.
Grifﬁth, Rachel, Stephen Redding, and John Van Reenen, “Mapping the Two
Faces of R&D: Productivity Growth in a Panel of OECD Industries,” mimeo-
graph, University College London, August 2001.
Grossman, Gene M., and Elhanan Helpman, Innovation and Growth in the Global
Economy (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1991).
Hall, Robert E., and Charles I. Jones, “Why Do Some Countries Produce so Much
More Output per Worker than Others?” Quarterly Journal of Economics,
CXIV (1999), 83–116.
Hansen, Gary D., and Edward C. Prescott, “Malthus to Solow,” American Eco-
nomic Review, CXII (2002), 1205–1217.
Harrison, Paul, Oren Sussman, and Joseph Zeira, “Finance and Growth: Theory
and New Evidence,” Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System,
Finance and Economics Discussion Series 99/35, July 1999.
Hauk, William R., Jr., and Romain Wacziarg, “A Monte Carlo Study of Growth
Regressions,” National Bureau of Economic Research Technical Working
Paper No. 296, January 2004.
Howitt, Peter, “Steady Endogenous Growth with Population and R&D Inputs
Growing,” Journal of Political Economy, CVII (1999), 715–730.
——, “Endogenous Growth and Cross-Country Income Differences,” American
Economic Review, XC (2000), 829–846.
Howitt, Peter, and David Mayer-Foulkes, “R&D, Implementation and Stagnation:
A Schumpeterian Theory of Convergence Clubs,” National Bureau of Eco-
nomic Research Working Paper No. 9104, August 2002.
Jones, Charles I., “R&D-Based Models of Economic Growth,” Journal of Political
Economy, CIII (1995), 759–784.
Kahn, Aubhik, “Financial Development and Economic Growth,” Macroeconomic
Dynamics, V (2001), 413–433.
Kaufmann, D., A. Kraay, and P. Zoido-Lobato ´n, “Aggregating Governance Indi-
cators,” World Bank Research Working Paper No. 2195, 1999a.
Kaufmann, D., A. Kraay, and P. Zoido-Lobato ´n, “Governance Matters,” World
Bank Research Working Paper No. 2196, 1999b.
Keller, Wolfgang, “Technology Diffusion and the World Distribution of Income:
The Role of Geography, Language, and Trade,” mimeograph, University of
Texas, June 2002.
221 FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND CONVERGENCEKing, Robert G., and Ross Levine, “Finance and Growth: Schumpeter Might Be
Right,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, CVIII (1993a), 717–737.
King, Robert G., and Ross Levine, “Finance, Entrepreneurship, and Growth,”
Journal of Monetary Economics, XXXII (1993b), 513–542.
Kiszewski, Anthony, Andrew Mellinger, Andrew Spielman, Pia Malaney, Sonia
Ehrlich Sachs, and Jeffrey Sachs, “A Global Index Representing the Stability
of Malaria Transmission,” American Journal of Tropical Medicine and Hy-
giene, LXX (2004), 486–498.
Klenow, Peter J., and Andre ´s Rodrı ´guez-Clare, “The Neoclassical Revival in
Growth Economics: Has it Gone too Far?” in Ben Bernanke and Julio Rotem-
berg, eds., NBER Macroeconomics Annual 1997 (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press,
1997).
Krebs, Tom, “Human Capital Risk and Economic Growth,” Quarterly Journal of
Economics, CXVIII (2003), 709–744.
La Porta, Rafael, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert W.
Vishny, “Legal Determinants of External Finance,” Journal of Finance, LII
(1997), 1131–1150.
La Porta, Rafael, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert W.
Vishny, “Law and Finance,” Journal of Political Economy, CVI (1998),
1113–1155.
Levine, Ross, “Stock Markets, Growth, and Tax Policy,” Journal of Finance, XLVI
(1991), 1445–1465.
——, “Financial Development and Economic Growth: Views and Agenda,” Journal
of Economic Literature, XXXV (1997), 688–726.
——, “Finance and Growth: Theory, Evidence, and Mechanisms,” in Philippe
Aghion and Steven N. Durlauf, eds., Handbook of Economic Growth (Amster-
dam: Elsevier, 2005), forthcoming.
Levine, Ross, Norman Loayza, and Thorsten Beck, “Financial Intermediation and
Growth: Causality and Causes,” Journal of Monetary Economics, LXVI
(2000), 31–77.
Lucas, Robert E., Jr., “Why Doesn’t Capital Flow from Rich to Poor Countries?”
American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings, LXXX (1990), 92–96.
Maddison, Angus, The World Economy: A Millennial Perspective (Paris, France:
OECD, 2001).
Mankiw, N. Gregory, David Romer, and David N. Weil, “A Contribution to the
Empirics of Economic Growth,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, CVII (1992),
407–437.
Mayer-Foulkes, David, “Global Divergence,” Documento de Trabajo del CIDE,
SDTE 250, Divisio ´n de Economı ´a, 2002.
Morales, Marı ´a F., “Financial Intermediation in a Model of Growth through
Creative Destruction,” Macroeconomic Dynamics, VII (2003), 363–393.
Nelson, Richard, and Edmund S. Phelps, “Investment in Humans, Technological
Diffusion, and Economic Growth,” American Economic Review, LVI (1966),
69–75.
Parente, Stephen L., and Edward C. Prescott, “Technology Adoption and Growth,”
Journal of Political Economy, CII (1994), 298–321.
Parente, Stephen L., and Edward C. Prescott, “Monopoly Rights: A Barrier to
Riches,” American Economic Review, LXXXIX (1999), 1216–1233.
Piketty, Thomas, “The Dynamics of the Wealth Distribution and the Interest Rate
with Credit Rationing,” Review of Economic Studies, LXIV (1997), 173–189.
Pritchett, Lant, “Divergence, Big-Time,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, XI
(1997), 3–17.
Saint-Paul, Gilles, “Technology Choice, Financial Markets and Economic Devel-
opment,” European Economic Review, XXXVI (1992), 763–781.
Sussman, Oren, “A Theory of Financial Development,” in A. Giovannini, ed.,
Finance and Development: Issues and Experience (New York, NY: Cambridge
University Press, 1993).
Temple, Jonathan, and Paul A. Johnson, “Social Capability and Economic
Growth,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, CXIII (1998), 965–990.
222 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS